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AFFIRMATIVE DUTY AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL TORT 
Michael Wells* & Thomas A. Eatont 
Constitutional tort is an area of burgeoning interest to litigants and 
scholars alike, 1 and has received considerable attention from the Supreme 
Court in recent years. The Court has developed doctrine on such issues 
as whether cities and states may be sued, 2 the kinds of official conduct 
that can form the basis for constitutional tort, 3 the scope of official 
immunity from damage liability, 4 principles of damage assessment, 5 
and causation. 6 Yet, on some important questions, constitutional tort 
doctrine remains primitive. One of these· questions is the scope of af-
firmative duty: When, if ever, may a government or officer be held 
liable for failing to help a plaintiff in peril? 
The Constitution ordinarily places only negative restrictions on 
government and does not require affirmative acts to assist individuals. 
The statutory vehicle for most constitutional tort litigation, 42 U.S.C. 
section 1983, echoes this constitutional principle. It extends liability 
to "[e]very person who ... [under color of state law] subjects, or 
causes to be subjected, any ... person" 1 to the deprivation of federal 
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I. See, e.g., P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER. HART & WECHSLER'S THE 
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 950 & n.3 (1973); id. at 233-34 (1981 Supp.) (describ-
ing the increase in civil rights litigation over the past twenty years); Schnapper, Civil Rights 
Litigation After Monell, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 213 (1979); Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 MICH. 
L. REV. 5 (1980). 
2. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979); Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 
U.S. 658 (1978). 
3. See Parran v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981); Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979); 
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976). 
4. See, e.g., Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980); Butz v. Economou, 438 
U.S. 478 (1978); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975). 
5. See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981); Carey v. Piphus, 435 
U.S. 247 (1978). See generally Note, Damage A wards in Constitutional Torts: A Reconsideration 
after Carey v. Piphus, 93 HARV. L. REV. 966 (1980). 
6. See, e.g., Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977). 
See generally Eaton, Causation in Constitutional Torts, 67 IowA L. REV. 443 (1982). 
7. 42 u.s.c. § 1983 (1976). 
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rights, and makes no provision for a duty on governmental defendants 
to stop others from harming the plaintiff. 8 
For some courts this principle disposes of affirmative duty claims 
forthwith. A noteworthy example is the recent seventh circuit case 
Bowers v. DeVito. 9 A man released from a state mental hospital killed 
a woman, and her estate brought a constitutional tort action against 
the officials responsible for his release. The court denied liability, ex-
plaining that "[t]he Constitution is a charter of negative liberties," 
that "it does not require ... the state to provide ... even so elemen-
tary a service as maintaining law and order," and that "as the State 
of Illinois has no federal constitutional duty to provide such protec-
tion its failure to do so is not actionable under section 1983." 10 
In spite of these constitutional and statutory principles, other courts 
have upheld affirmative duty claims in constitutional tort. 11 Their opin-
ions, however, do not adequately explain the foundation and scope 
of these affirmative duties. In particular, they do not respond to the 
rationale of Bowers, that constitutional tort is available only to redress 
violations of constitutional rights. 
This Article argues that the Bowers principle is wrong. It examines 
the issues of doctrine and policy that bear on the affirmative duty ques-
tion in constitutional tort and contends that affirmative duties may 
be imposed even though constitutional rights are generally negative in 
character, as a matter of federal constitutional common law. It ·develops 
a foundation in doctrine and policy, so far lacking in the opinions, 
to support these duties and to place proper limits upon them. 
Part I identifies issues of tort policy that arise in affirmative duty 
cases, while Part II addresses the distinctive problems that come up 
in the constitutional tort context. Part III utilizes the analysis and con-
clusions reached in the preceding parts of the Article to derive two 
proposed principles for decision of these cases: First, where a govern-
mental defendant has no prior control over the plaintiff or the injurer, 
as where a policeman chances upon a mugging on a street corner, a 
duty should be imposed only when the defendant knows the facts regard-
ing the danger, or recklessly disregards those facts, and can respond 
8. A related statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (1976), explicitly imposes an affirmative duty to take 
action against KKK-style terrorism. See Peck v. United States, 470 F. Supp. 1003 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). 
9. 686 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1982). 
IO. 686 F.2d at 618. The court was wrong in characterizing this as an affirmative duty prob-
lem. The plaintiff's claim was based on the defendants' action in releasing a dangerous person. 
The claim may fail on other grounds, cf. Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 285 (1980) (ruling 
on similar facts that the death was "too remote a consequence of the parole officers' action 
to hold them responsible under the federal civil rights law"), but it does not present the question 
of what purely affirmative duties are owed by government. 
11. See, e.g., Putnam v. Gerloff, 639 F.2d 415, 423 (8th Cir. 1981); Byrd v. Brishke, 466 
F.2d 6, 9-11 (7th Cir. 1972); Cottonreader v. Johnson, 252 F. Supp. 492, 499 (M.D. Ala. 1966). 
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to the danger immediately and with relative ease. Second, where the 
governmental defendant exercises control over the plaintiff or the 
danger, as when the plaintiff is a prisoner seeking protection from other 
inmates, the knowledge and ability requirements should be relaxed and 
liability imposed under a negligence, or perhaps gross negligence, 
standard. 
I. A TORTS PERSPECTIVE 
Long before section 1983 became a popular vehicle for claiming af-
firmative duties owed by government, plaintiffs brought such claims 
under common law principles. This part of the Article will sketch this 
case law and identify the conflicting policy considerations that underlie 
these decisions. The discussion will provide the necessary background 
for a consideration of the distinctive questions raised when an affirm-
ative duty claim is asserted under the Constitution. 
A. The Initial Rule: No Duty to Act 
The first principle in the law of affirmative duties is that the govern-
ment, like an individual, owes no general tort obligation to help anyone. 
Thus, there is no general duty owed by police to the citizenry to pro-
tect them from crime. 12 This principle is illustrated by the well-known 
case Riss v. City of New York. 11 A rejected suitor threatened on several 
occasions to injure the plaintiff if she married another man. The plaintiff 
relayed these threats to the police and rep~atedly requested protection, 
but her requests were refused. The threats were carried out by a hired 
thug who threw lye in the plaintiff's face. The court dismissed her 
tort suit, holding that the city had no duty enforceable in tort to pro-
tect her from the attack. 
The rationale for the no-duty rule differs sharply depending on 
whether the defendant is public or private. The no-duty rule as ap-
plied to individuals rests primarily on libertarian values. A state-imposed 
duty to act would seriously impinge upon individual freedom and 
autonomy. As Professor Epstein argues, if the government can 
legitimately require one person to act for the exclusive benefit of another, 
"it becomes impossible to tell where liberty ends and obligation 
begins." 14 Furthermore, a tort duty to act is thought to undermine 
12. See Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354 (1919); Warren v. District of Columbia, 444 
A.2d I (App. D.C. 1981); De Hont:y v. Hernandez, 122 Ariz. 367, 595 P.2d 159 (1979); Brut-
tomesso v. Las Vegas Metro Police Dep't, 95 Nev. 151,591 P.2d 254 (1979). See generally Note, 
Police Liability for Negligent Failure to Prevent Crime, 94 HARV. L. REV. 821 (1981). 
13. 22 N.Y.2d 579, 240 N.E.2d 860, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897 (1968). 
14. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 1. LEGAL STUD. 151, 199 (1973). Other scholars 
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the moral worth of an individual's decision to help another person 
iri distress. The threat of tort liability adds an element of compulsion 
which muddles the question of motivation essential to determining the 
moral quality of the act. 1 s 
When the defendant is a government or its officer, individual 
autonomy is not an issue. Consequently, the no-duty rule must look 
elsewhere for support. Although courts employ several doctrinal for-
mulas in deciding these cases, 16 the one most frequently invoked is the 
"public duty doctrine." In the typical affirmative duty case, the govern-
ment defendant is subject to a statute or ordinance requiring it to pro-
vide some sort of service to its citizens. The plaintiff alleges that the 
government's negligent failure to provide these services caused his 
injury. 11 The public duty doctrine holds that this legislation creates 
only a duty owed to the public in general, and does not provide the 
basis for an individual negligence action. In Cracraft v. City of St. 
Louis Park, 18 for example, the plaintiff was injured when a drum con-
taining duplicating fluid exploded at a high school. The plaintiff alleged 
that the defendant city was negligent in failing to discover the drum 
and have it removed pursuant to a local ordinance. In dismissing the 
action the court reasoned that a duty of care arises only when the 
municipality has attempted to protect a specific class of persons. 19 
These cases curiously suggest that because a duty is owed to everyone, 
have advanced utilitarian arguments against such a duty. See Landes & Posner, Safvors, Finders, 
Good Samaritans and Other Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 83 (1975). 
15. Epstein, supra note 14, at 200. Despite harsh criticism by commentators, the no-duty 
rule continues to apply generally to individuals. See Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 
90 YALE L.J. 247 (1980). 
16. Courts may deny liability on the grounds that the requested government action involves 
a "discretionary" or "governmental" function. See, e.g., Stevenson v. State Dep't. of Transp., 
290 Ore. 3, 619 P.2d 247 (1980); Silver v. City of Minneapolis, 284 Minn. 266, 170 N.W.2d 
206 (1969); Keane v. City of Chicago, 240 N.E.2d 321 (Ill. App. 1968). 
17. See, e.g., Whalen v. County of Clark, 96 Nev. 559,613 P.2d 407 (1980) (alleged negligent 
failure to prosecute a dangerous person); Massingill v. Yuma County, 104 Ariz. 518, 456 P.2d 
376 (1969) (alleged negligent failure to provide police protection); Baerlein v. State, 92 Wash. 
2d 229, 595 P.2d 930 (1979) (alleged negligent failure to enforce state securities laws); Steitz 
v. City of Beacon, 295 N.Y. 51, 64 N.E.2d 704, 63 N.Y.S.2d 51 (1945) (alleged negligent failure 
to provide fire protection). 
18. 279 N.W.2d 801 (Minn. 1979). 
19. According to the court, 
[a] municipality does not owe any individual a duty of care merely by the fact that 
it enacts a general ordinance requiring fire code inspections or by the fact that it [under-
takes an] inspection for fire code violations. A duty of care arises only when there 
are additional indicia that the municipality has undertaken the responsibility of not 
only protecting itself, but also undertaken the responsibility of protecting a particular 
class of persons from the risks associated with fire code violations. 
Id. at 806. For a general discussion of the public duty doctrine see 18 E. MCQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL 
CORPORATIONS § 53.04b (3d ed. 1977). 
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it is enforceable by no one. 20 The proffered justification for this ap-
parent paradox is the importance of preserving executive and legislative 
discretion in allocating limited public resources. Representative of the 
judicial philosophy underlying the public duty doctrine is the majority 
opinion in Riss v. City of New York. 21 In explaining why the city owed 
no duty to Miss Riss, Judge Breitel noted that before the court could 
hold the city responsible there should be a legislative determination 
of the scope of public responsibility. 22 
By emphasizing this discretion value, the cases acknowledge that pro-
tection of individuals from crime is only one of the many goals that 
government may pursue. Affirmative tort obligations would compel 
governments to allocate public resources in a particular way, or risk 
tort liability. The increasing demands on public resources might ex-
ceed economic or political limitations. The value of discretion holds 
that government officials must be given leeway to decide what mix 
of goals to pursue and how to spend public resources in pursuit of 
those goals. 
In contrast with the libertarian rationale of the private no-duty cases, 
the discretion value does not evidence distrust of government. Rather, 
it is concerned with the distribution of power within government. Im-
plicit in this view is a confidence that the legislative and executive 
branches can properly define the obligations of government and allocate 
resources to achieve public goals. These officials are commonly believed 
to be more sensitive to public attitudes than judges and to have better 
access to a wide range of information. To this extent, the no-
20. In criticizing the majority opinion in Riss, Judge Keating noted "[i]t is not a distortion 
to summarize the essence of the city's case here in the following language: 'Because we owe 
a duty to everyone, we owe it to nobody.'" Riss v. City of New York, 22 N:Y.2d 581,585, 
240 N.E.2d 860, 862, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897, 901 (1968) (dissent). 
21. 22 N.Y.2d 581, 240 N.E.2d 860, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897 (1968). 
22. Judge Breitel argued that: 
[t]he amount of protection that may be provided is limited by the resources of the com-
munity and by a considered legislative-executive decision as to how those resources may 
be deployed. For the courts to proclaim a new and general duty of protection in the 
law of tort, even to those who may be the particular seekers of protection based on 
specific hazards, could and would inevitably determine how the limited police resources 
of the community should be allocated and without predictable limits. This is quite dif-
ferent from the predictable allocation of resources and liabilities when public hospitals, 
rapid transit systems, or even highways are provided. Before such extension of respon-
sibilities, there should be a legislative determination that that should be the scope of 
public responsibility. 
Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 581-82, 240 N.E.2d 86~1, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897, 
898 (1968). See also, e.g., National Bd. of Y.M.C.A. v. United States, 395 U.S. 85, 95 (1969) 
(Harlan, J., concurring); Massingill v. Yuma County, 104 Ariz. 518, 523, 456 P.2d 376, 381 
(1969); Warren v .. District of Columbia, 444 A.2d l, 8-9 (App. D.C. 1981); Simpson's Food 
Fair, Inc. v. City of Evansville, 149 Ind. App. 387,272 N.E.2d 871,875 (1971); Silver v. City 
of.Minneapolis, 284 Minn. 266, 272, 170 N.W.2d 206, 209 (1969). 
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governmental-duty rule reflects a commitment to democratic values and 
the political process. 23 
B. Exceptions To The No-Duty Rule 
Despite the general rule that police owe no tort duty to prevent crime, 
courts have imposed affirmative obligations on government to protect 
certain limited classes of people. Witnesses, informants, and other per-
sons who cooperitte in criminal investigations are said to have a special 
relationship with the government that entitles them to protection. 24 
Affirmative duties also arise when government assumes custody of an 
individual. Once a police officer arrests an individual, the government 
must exercise reasonable care in providing medical and security 
services. 25 In both these instances the government has established a 
relationship between itself and the plaintiff sufficient to create an af-
firmative duty. 
23. The recent case of Warren v. District of Columbia, 444 A.2d I (App. D.C. 1981), con-
tains an uncommonly detailed discussion of how the public duty doctrine advances the value 
of discretion and its corollary trust in the political process. In explaining why the police owed 
no duty to help three women who requested immediate assistance to stop an on-going violent 
assault, the court observed: 
The absence of a duty specifically enforceable by individual members of the com-
munity is not peculiar to public police services. Our representative form of government 
is replete with duties owed to everyone in their capacity as citizens but not enforceable 
by anyone in his capacity as an individual. Through its representatives, the public creates 
community service; through its representatives the public establishes the standards which 
it demands of its employees in carrying out those services and through its represen-
tatives, the public can most effectively enforce adherence to those standards of com-
petence. As members of the general public, individuals forego any direct control over 
the conduct of public employees in the same manner that such individuals avoid any 
direct responsibility for compensating public employees. 
Plaintiffs in this action would have the Court and a jury of twelve additional com-
munity representatives join in the responsibility of judging the adequacy of a public 
employee's performance in office .... Consistent with this contention then, should 
a Court and jury also undertake to sift through clues known to the police in order 
to determine whether a criminal could reasonably have been apprehended before com-
mitting a second crime? Should a Court also be empowered to evaluate, in the context 
of a tort action, the handling of a major fire and determine whether the hoses were 
properly placed and the firemen correctly allocated? Might a Court also properly enter-
tain a tort claim over a school teacher's ability to teach seventh grade English or over 
a postman's failure to deliver promptly an important piece of mail? 
Id. at 8. 
24. See, e.g., Schuster v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534, 180 N.Y.S.2d 
265 (1958); Estate of Tanasijevich v. City of Hammond, 583 N.E.2d 1081 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978); 
Christy v. City of Baton Rouge, 282 So. 2d 274 (La. Ct. App. 1973); Gardner v. Village of 
Chicago Ridge, 71 Ill. App. 2d 373, 219 N.E.2d 147 (1966). See generally Note, Police Liability 
for Negligent Failure to Prevent Crime, 94 HARV. L. REV. 821, 824-25 (1981). 
25. See Methola v. County of Eddy, 95 N.M. 329, 622 P.2d 234 (1981); Daniels v. Ander-
son, 195 Neb. 95, 237 N.W.2d 397 (1975); Binkman v. City of Indianapolis, 141 Ind. App. 
662, 231 N.E.2d 169 (1967); Porter v. County of Cook, 42 Ill. App. 3d 287, 355 N.E.2d 21, 
561 (1976); Thomas v. Williams, 105 Ga. App. 321, 124 S.E.2d 409 (1962). 
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In other instances the duty arises from the relationship between the 
government and the third party tortfeasor. This relationship may be 
seen in a variety of contexts. In Corridon v. City of Bayonne, 26 for 
example, the plaintiff was shot with a service revolver by an intox-
icated off-duty policeman. The court found that by arming the of-
ficer, the city assumed the duty to supervise him. The government had 
also been held to owe affirmative duties towards victims of crimes com-
mitted by certain persons released from government custody. In Reiser 
v. District of Columbia21 the government obtained a job for a parolee 
as a handyman in an apartment complex. The government did not 
disclose to the employer that the parolee had a history of sex offenses• 
and psychiatric problems and was then under suspicion in three murders. 
The parolee eventually killed the plaintiff's decedent, who resided in 
the apartment complex. The government's role in securing the employ-
ment coupled with its knowledge of the risks, gave rise to a special 
relationship between it and the residents of the apartment. The nature 
of the relationship between the government and the third-party tort-
f easor in these examples varies considerably, yet each is considered 
a "special relationship" that requires the government to take some 
action for the benefit of potential victims. 
Affirmative duties have been imposed on governments on account 
of some action they have undertaken voluntarily. In City of Prichard 
v. Kelley, 28 for example, the city had erected a stop sign at an intersec-
tion. It was removed sometime prior to the plaintiff's accident. The 
plaintiff alleged that the city's negligent failure to maintain the stop 
sign contributed to the accident. The city contended it owed the plain-
tiff no duty to maintain that stop sign. In ruling for the plaintiff, the 
court noted that by erecting the stop sign the city had volunteered to 
act, and consequently was thereafter responsible for acting with due 
care. 29 Similarly, if a government undertakes to inspect premises or 
warn a person of threatening danger, it must act with reasonable care. 30 
26. 129 N.J. Super. 393, 324 A.2d 42 (App. Div. 1974). Accord Bonsignore v. City of New 
York, 683 F.2d 635 (2d Cir. 1982); Baker v. City of New York, 25 A.D.2d 770,269 N.Y.S.2d 
515 (1966). 
27. 563 F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir. 1977), aff'd en bane, 580 F.2d 647 (D.C. Cir. 1978). See gener-
ally Comment, Victims' Suit Against Government Entities and Officials For Reckless Release, 
29 AM. U.L. REV. 595 (1980); Note, Holding Governments Strictly Liable for the Release of 
Dangerous Parolees, 55 N. Y. U. L. REV. 907 (1980). 
28. 386 So. 2d 403 (Ala. 1980). 
29. City of Pritchard v. Kelley, 386 So. 2d 403, 406-07 (Ala. 1980). According to the court, 
because maintenance of the sign was necessarily a part of that responsibility, the city was under 
a duty to keep the sign maintained in a reasonable safe condition. Id. Accord McClure v. Nampa 
Highway Dist., 102 Idaho 197,628 P.2d 228 (1981); Florence v. Goldberg, 44 N.Y.2d 189,357 
N.E.2d 763, 404 N.Y.S.2d 583 (1978); Padgett v. School Bd. of Escambia County, 395 So. 2d 
584 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981). 
30. See Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235 (Alaska 1976); Brown v. MacPhearson's, Inc., 86 
Wash. 2d 293, 545 P.2d 13 (1975). 
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Statutes, ordinances, and even constitutional provisions have pro-
vided the basis for affirmative public duties. Municipalities frequently 
are required by statute or ordinance to conduct various types of safety 
inspections. People injured in fires have successfully brought actions 
against cities for their negligence in failing either to discover some hazard 
or enforce code provisions. 31 Courts employing this rationale avoid 
the public duty doctrine by finding a legislative intent to protect from 
this particular risk an identifiable class of persons of which the plain-
tiff is a member. 
The statutory duty rationale can be invoked in a variety of settings. 
In Hoyem v. Manhattan Beach School District32 a ten year old boy 
was struck by a motorcycle after he left school without permission. 
The school board's liability was based on a statute prohibiting students 
from leaving school grounds during normal class hours. The court found 
this statute was intended to protect children, and therefore supported 
the duty of school officials to exercise reasonable care to prevent students 
from leaving the school grounds. Similarly, in Saint Patrick Hospital 
v. Powell County, 33 a state constitutional provision and implementing 
statute were held affirmatively to obligate counties to provide medical 
care to the indigent. The range of legislative pronouncements and the 
ease with which legislative intent can be manipulated renders the 
statutory duty rationale fertile grounds for potential expansion of public 
affirmative duties. 
Two policy considerations support all these exceptions to the no-
duty rule. One justification is that the general welfare will be improved 
if government is required to help individuals in need. The first premise 
of this policy is that government should play an active role in the af-
fairs of the community. The Supreme Court articulated this view of 
government in City of Chicago v. Sturges. 34 In upholding the constitu-
tionality of a statute holding cities strictly liable for damages resulting 
from mob violence occurring within their boundaries, the Court noted: 
"[p]rimarily, governments exist for the maintenance of social order[;] 
hence it is the obligation of government to protect life, liberty and 
property against the conduct of the indifferent, the careless, and the 
evil minded." 35 
The case for affirmative duties, however, does more than envision 
an active role for government. It also accepts the propriety of judicial 
input in defining the extent of that role. Those who favor public duties 
31. Wilson v. Nepstad, 282 N.W.2d 664 (Iowa 1979); Coffey v. City of Milwaukee, 74 Wis. 
2d 526, 247 N.W.2d 132 (1976). Cf. Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235 (Alaska 1976) (the same 
result reached by way of an undertaking-to-act rationale). 
32. 22 Cal. 3d 508, 585 P.2d 851, 150 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1978). 
33. 156 Mont. 153, 477 P.2d 340 (1970). 
34. 222 U.S. 313 (1911). 
35. City of Chicago v. Sturgis, 222 U.S. 313, 322 (1911). 
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to act approve of the use of tort law to encourage government to pro-
tect individuals from injury. A good exposition of this view can be 
found in Professor Shapo's book, The Duty To Act. 36 Professor Shapo 
takes the view that affirmative duties, both public and private, ought 
to be founded on the defendant's power to help and the plaintiff's 
dependency upon that power for protection. Suppose, for example, 
a building burns on account of a violation of a building code that 
the city negligently failed to enforce. Most people are unable to deter-
mine whether the buildings they occupy comply with pertinent safety 
regulations. They are dependent on government inspectors to detect 
violations and enforce the law. This combination of power and 
dependency gives rise to the government's duty to act. If the govern-
ment inspector had enforced the building code, the fire might not have 
occurred or lives might have been saved. In such circumstances those 
who highly value protection maintain that the government's failure to 
act should give rise to liability. 37 
Some decisions imposing a duty to act on a government can be ade-
quately explained in terms of discretion and protection values alone. 38 
In many cases, however, there is a second policy consideration that 
strengthens the plaintiff's claim. In these cases the government is in 
some way connected with the plaintiff or his injury. Fairness between 
the plaintiff and the government defendant justifies governmental liabil-
ity for failing to help. 
Thus, many courts hold that it is fair to impose a duty to act when 
the government contributes to the creation of a dangerous condition. 
Requiring a police officer with a history of public intoxication to carry 
36. M. SHAPO, THE DUTY TO ACT (1977). 
37. Id. at 95-96. 
38. See, e.g., Campbell v. City of Bellevue, 85 Wash. 2d I, 530 P.2d 234 (1975). The city 
had actual knowledge that a landowner had placed electric lights in a stream in violation of 
a local ordinance. City officials were also aware that this condition presented a serious risk of 
death. Despite this knowledge, statutory enforcement procedures were not implemented until 
one person was killed and another was seriously injured. While adhering to the general public 
duty doctrine, the court found a special relationship to exist on the basis of the city's actual 
awareness of the dangerous condition. Accord Halvorson v. Dahl, 89 Wash. 2d 673, 574 P.2d 
1190 (1978) (building code violation). Jurisdictions that are otherwise reluctant to recognize public 
affirmative duties indicate a willingness to do so if the governmental defendant has knowledge 
of a dangerous condition that violates a local ordinance. See, e.g., Hanson v. City of St. Paul, 
298 Minn. 205, 214 N.W.2d 346 (1976) (knowledge of a dog's vicious propensities created a 
duty to impound the animal that can support a tort action brought by a person subsequently 
bitten). Cf. Cracraft v. City of St. Louis Park, 279 N.W.2d 801, 806 (Minn. 1979) (rejecting 
a claim based on an alleged negligent failure to discover a violation of the municipal fire or-
dinance, but suggesting the outcome would be different if city officials had actual knowledge 
of the dangerous condition). In these cases, the defendants did not contribute to the creation 
of the dangerous condition, but merely failed to act on it. Recognition of a duty to act in this 
instance can be explained only in terms of the value of protection. Awareness of the danger 
coupled with the legislatively sanctioned responsibility to alleviate it overrides the concerns that 
underlie the discretion value. 
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a weapon at all times creates a substantial risk of danger to the public. 
Consequently, the city is obligated to supervise the officer. 39 The govern-
ment also creates a dangerous condition when it provides persons with 
violent tendencies unique access to their potential victims. 40 The same 
rationale can justify imposing positive duties on governments with regard 
to their custody over inmates, 41 maintenance of roads, 42 and other types 
of undertakings. 43 In each instance the government, by affirmative con-
duct, has contributed to the risk facing the plaintiff and therefore may 
be required to act to protect him. 
A second aspect of the fairness value is reliance on a promise. When 
the plaintiff or another relies on a government promise, it is fair to 
enforce that promise through tort law. In Brown v. MacPherson 's, 
Inc., 44 for example, a potential rescuer allegedly refrained from warn-
ing the plaintiff of the pending danger of an avalanche in reliance on 
government assurances that it would warn the plaintiff. The failure 
to act on that promise was held to provide an adequate theoretical 
basis for recovery. In Brinkman v. City of Jndianapolis45 the police 
promised potential rescuers that they would take the plaintiff to a 
hospital. Instead, they arrested the plaintiff for being intoxicated. The 
plaintiff died the night of his arrest from pneumonia. The unfulfilled 
promise of medical assistance provided a fair basis for imposing liability. 
In these and similar cases, 46 the duty to act rests, at least in part, on 
39. See Bonsignore v. City of New York, 683 F.2d 635 (2d Cir. 1982); Corridon v. City 
of Bayonne, 129 N.J. Super. 393, 324 A.2d 42, 44 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1974); Baker v. City 
of New York, 25 A.D.2d 770, 774, 269 N.Y.S.2d 515, 519 (1966). 
40. See Rieser v. District of Columbia, 563 F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir. 1977), aff'd en bane, 580 
F.2d 647 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Hicks v. United States, 511 F.2d 407 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Johnson 
v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 447 P.2d 352, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1968). 
41. See Methola v. County of Eddy, 95 N.M. 329,622 P.2d 234 (1981); Daniels v. Andersen, 
195 Neb. 95,237 N.W.2d 397 (1975); Porter v. County of Cook, 42 Ill. App. 3d 287, 355 N.E.2d 
561 (1976); Thomas v. Williams, 105 Ga. App. 321, 124 S.E.2d 409 (1962). 
42. See, e.g., City of Prichard v. Kelley, 386 So. 2d 403 (Ala. 1980); McClure v. Nampa 
Highway Dist., 102 Idaho 197, 628 P.2d 228 (1981); Symmonds v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. 
Paul & Pac. Ry. Co., 242 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa 1976). 
43. See, e.g., Lorshbough v. Township of Buzzle, 258 N.W.2d 96 (Minn. 1977) (the city 
owes a duty of care to adjacent landowners to safely maintain a public dumping site); Bradford 
v. Davis, 290 Or. 855, 626 P.2d 1376 (1981) (possible duty of care owed by state officials to 
a child in connection with his placement in foster homes). 
44. 86 Wash. 2d 293, 545 P.2d 13 (1975). 
45. 141 Ind. App. 662, 231 N.E.2d 169 (1967). 
46. See, e.g., Fair v. United States, 234 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1956) (the government's promise 
to warn the plaintiff if a dangerous patient was released gave rise to a duty to act on that promise); 
Silverman v. City of Fort Wayne, 171 Ind. App. 415, 357 N.E.2d 285 (1976) (dismissal of negligence 
complaint arising from a failure to protect property during a riot reversed in light of personal 
promise of protection); Baker v. City of New York, 25 A.D. 770, 269 N.Y.S.2d 515 (1966) (the 
issuance by the Domestic Court of a certificate authorizing the arrest of the plaintiff's estranged 
husband upon her request created a special duty to protect her); Bloom v. City of New York, 
78 Misc. 2d 1077, 357 N.Y.S.2d 979 (1974) (alleged negligent provision of police protection held 
actionable in light of specific assurances of protection by police and reliance thereon by plaintiffs). 
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the affirmative representations by the government and detrimental 
reliance thereon by potential rescuers. 
A third element of equity that appears in the cases is the concept 
of reciprocity. If a person comes forward at the government's request 
and assists it in performing some public endeavor, it is fair to require 
the government to protect that individual from risks associated with 
that activity. Thus, in Schuster v. City of New York, 47 the city owed 
a "reciprocal duty" to protect an informant from retaliation by a 
criminal suspect. Similarly, there is an affirmative duty to protect in-
dividuals who identify suspects, assist police in the apprehension of 
suspects, or otherwise cooperate with police in their investigation of 
crime. 48 
C. The Ranking and Weighing of Values 
Labels such as "public duty" and "special relationship" do not assist 
greatly in the analysis of cases. One can ascertain what makes the duty 
"public" or the relationship "special" only by reference to underlying 
values. The values of discretion, protection, and fairness best explain 
judicial decisions in this area. But merely identifying these values does 
not by itself determine the outcome of cases. The ranking and weighing 
of values is crucial to the resolution of particular cases. 
This proposition is best illustrated by the inspection cases. A statute 
or ordinance directs the government to inspect a building and provides 
some mechanism for enforcement. The plaintiff urges that negligence 
in connection with the inspection or enforcement proximately caused 
his injury. Liability hinges on whether the government owed a duty 
to the plaintiff. Several courts have found such a duty; others have 
not. 49 Although similar facts and statutes are involved, and the same 
doctrinal terminology is invoked, the cases reach diametrically opposite 
conclusions. These divergent results can be explained only in terms of 
differing assessments of the relative worth of protection and discre-
tion values. 
47. 5 N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534, 180 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1958). 
48. See Gardner v. Village of Chicago Ridge, 71 lll. App. 2d 373, 219 N.E.2d 147 (1966); 
Estate of Tanasijevich v. City of Hammond, 383 N.E.2d 1081 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978); Christy 
v. City of Baton Rouge, 282 So. 2d 724 (La. Ct. App. 1973). Cf. In re Quarles and Butler, 
158 U.S. 532, 536 (1895) ("it is the duty of that government to see that he may exercise this 
right [to assist law enforcement] freely, and to protect him from violence while doing so, or 
on account of so doing.") (quoting Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 652 (1884)). 
49. Compare Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235 (Alaska 1976); Wilson v. Nepstad, 282 N.W.2d 
664 (Iowa 1979); and Coffey v. City of Milwaukee, 74 Wis. 2d 526, 247 N.W.2d 132 (1976), 
with Cracraft v. City of St. Louis Park, 279 N.W.2d 801 (Minn. 1979); Duran v. City of Tucson, 
20 Ariz. App. 22, 509 P.2d 1059 (1973); Steman v. Coffman, 92 Mich. App. 595, 285 N.W.2d 
305 (1979), and Dinsky v. Town of Framington, 438 N.E.2d 51 (Mass. 1982). 
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Courts also assign different weights to the fairness value. For some 
courts, reliance on a government's promise to act provides a sufficient 
equitable basis to impose affirmative tort obligations. In Fair v. United 
States50 the government's promise to warn the plaintiff if a dangerous 
patient was released gave rise to a duty to act. Other courts, however, 
do not accord such weight to government representations. In Hender-
son v. City of Petersburg51 the plaintiff requested and was assured by 
police of protection. The plaintiff followed police instructions, but the 
promised protection was not forthcoming and the plaintiff was shot. 
In upholding the dismissal of the action against the city, the court in-
voked the principle that police protection is a duty owed to the public 
and not to the plaintiff individually. 52 
The point here is that courts may place different weights on the value 
of discretion, protection, and fairness, and accordingly draw different 
conclusions on the issue of duty. A court less concerned with def er-
ring to the other branches of government than with protecting children 
can seize upon a vaguely worded truancy statute to impose a tort duty 
on school officials to prevent unauthorized excursions from school. 53 
The equitable considerations supporting a duty in such a case are weak 
and the potential impact on discretion is great. 54 The decision can best 
be understood in terms of the primacy of the protection value. On 
the other hand, a court more concerned with discretion can hold that 
police, with no urgent business to detain them, owe no duty to timely 
respond to a reported crime in progress. 55 The results in these cases 
do not depend on doctrinal labels, but the relative rank and weight 
of the competing values. 
The foregoing discussion of common law tort policy provides the 
foundation necessary to examine affirmative duties in constitutional 
50. 234 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1956). See also cases cited supra notes 44-46. 
51. 247 So. 2d 23 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971). 
52. Henderson v. City of Petersberg, 247 So. 2d 23, 25 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971). See also 
Warren v. District of Columbia, 444 A.2d I (D.C. 1981) (no duty owed to woman who returned 
to her apartment upon receiving assurances from the police that help was on the way); Falco 
v. City of New York, 34 A.D.2d 673, 310 N.Y.S.2d 524 (App. Div. 1970), aff'd, 29 N.Y.2d 
918, 279 N.E.2d 854, 329 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1972) (police officer's statement to injured motorcyclist 
that he would obtain the name of the motorist who struck the motorcycle was a gratuitous promise 
and did not create a legal duty). CJ. Jackson v. Heymann, 126 N.J. Super. 281, 314 A.2d 82 
(Law Div. 1973) (police officer's investigation of a vehicle/pedestrian accident did not create 
a duty to identify the driver of the vehicle). 
53. See Hoyem v. Manhattan Beach City School Dist., 22 Cal. 3d 508, 585 P.2d 851, 150 
Cal. Rptr. I (1978). 
54. The school neither created the risk of the accident nor promised to protect the plaintiff 
from the harm. The recognition of a duty in this case may force local school officials to allocate 
more resources for security at the expense of academic needs. Id. at 527-28, 585 P.2d at 863, 
150 Cal. Rptr. at 13 (Richardson, J., dissenting). 
55. Warren v. District of Columbia, 444 A.2d I (D.C. 1981) (en bane); Doe v. Hendricks, 
92 N.M. 499, 590 P.2d 647 (1979). 
FALL 1982] Affirmative Duty and Constitutional Tort 13 
tort. The tension between the values of discretion on the one hand, 
and protection and fairness on the other, is present in constitutional 
tort cases as well as in common law tort. The distinctive issue in con-
stitutional torts is how the constitutional aspects of the suit should 
affect the policy choices that must be made. We now turn to the task 
of identifying additional values and doctrinal constraints that should 
be considered when the suit depends on the Constitution, and the ques-
tion whether these considerations support a broader or narrower view 
of affirmative duties. 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 
The basic distinction between traditional common law tort and con-
stitutional tort is the source of the defendant's obligations. Traditional 
tort obligations originate in judge's power to make common law and 
from specific legislative directives, while constitutional tort duties must 
be justified by reference to the federal Constitution. This characteristic 
of constitutional tort presents a serious obstacle to the development 
o( affirmative duties, for the Constitution ordinarily protects the in-
dividual from state action directed against him, and does not entitle 
him to help from the state; There are some circumstances, examined 
in section A below, where the negative character of constitutional rights 
is not a problem, but for the bulk of cases it must either be answered 
or affirmative duty abandoned. 
In section B we argue that this objection, based on the negative nature 
of constitutional rights, rests on a faulty premise: that constitutional 
tort is merely a mechanism for redressing violations of constitutional 
rights. A better view is that constitutional tort comprises both con-
stitutional and tort principles. It is well-settled that tort principles can 
be employed to limit the protection of constitutional rights, as by rules 
that immunize government officers from liability. But tort principles 
may also be invoked to expand liability beyond constitutional rights 
to include the vindication of constitutional values as well. When a 
government failure to help affronts the constitutional value of con-
cern and respect for persons, it is proper to impose liability even if 
the plaintiff can show no violation of his constitutional rights. 
Besides this threshold objection, the use of the Constitution as a 
source of affirmative duties raises another question. How, if at all, 
does the analysis of a constitutional tort affirmative duty claim differ 
from the common law cases examined in Part I? In section C we show 
that both the discretion and protection interests are affected by the 
constitutional nature of the duty. The case for constitutional tort af-
firmative duty is sometimes stronger and sometimes weaker than for 
a common law duty, depending on how strongly a given case implicates 
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not only the plaintiff's interest in physical safety, but also the con-
stitutional value of concern and respect. 
Section D addresses an objection based on federalism that is made 
against constitutional tort in general, and therefore bears on affirmative 
duty cases as well. Most constitutional tort cases are brought in federal 
courts under federal substantive standards against state officers and 
local governments. Critics say that the value of state and local in-
dependence should restrain the imposition of constitutional tort duties. 
Affirmative duties may be especially vulnerable to restriction on this 
ground, because they rest on constitutional values and not rights, and 
because they may be deemed more intrusive on government prerogatives 
than negative duties. Even so, we argue against restrictions on con-
stitutional tort that are motivated by values of federalism. 
A. Constitutional Rights and Constitutional Tort 
1. A constitutional right to protection?- The simplest and most 
common method for the plaintiff to establish a constitutional tort claim 
is to show that the defendant has violated some constitutional right, 
such as his right of free speech or his right against unreasonable searches. 
When he seeks to impose an affirmative duty on government, however, 
he often faces severe obstacles in establishing a constitutional viola-
tion. Constitutional rights are generally negative in character, protect-
ing the individual against gove.rnment invasions and guaranteeing his 
liberty to pursue his own ends, but not entitling him to help from 
government. 56 This feature of constitutional rights is reflected in the 
rule that state action must be shown to establish a constitutional viola-
tion, and in the limitation of section 1983 to action taken "under color 
of'' state law. 57 The litigation concerning these rules focuses on whether 
conduct of nongovernmental actors can fit within their terms, but the 
premise underlying them is that the Constitution protects against harm 
56. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 318 (1980) (abortions); Maher v. Roe, 432 
U.S. 464, 469 (1977) (medical treatment); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) (housing). 
See generally G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 963-68 (10th ed. 
1980). 
57. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & Supp. 1981). The "under color of" state law provision of 
section 1983 is equivalent to the "state action" limitation of the fourteenth amendment. Lugar 
· v. Edmondson Oil Co., 102 S.Ct. 2744, 2753 (1982). Lugar emphasized the functional importance 
of the state action doctrine as follows: 
Careful adherence to the "state action" requirement preserves an area of individual 
freedom by limiting the reach of federal law and federal judicial power. It also avoids 
imposing on the state, its agencies or officials, responsibility for conduct for which 
they cannot fairly be blamed. A major consequence is to require the courts to respect 
the limits of their own power as directed against state governments and private interests. 
Whether this is good or bad policy, it is a fundamental fact of our political order. 
Id. at 2754. 
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for which the state is responsible, and does not entitle him to protec-
tion by the state against harm from other sources. 
There are circumstances where the state owes a duty to act on the 
individual's behalf, but most of these depend on some other govern-
ment action that significantly affects him. For example, the eighth 
amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. Compliance with 
this negative command requires prison officials to provide physical 
security and medical services. 58 Similarly, due process demands that 
the state provide training for retarded persons involuntarily commit-
ted to state institutions. 59 Such cases do not depart from the fundamental 
premise that constitutional rights only extend to protection against state 
action. The requisite state action is found in the assumption of custody 
over the inmate. The act of confinement preempts potential rescuers 
and reduces the inmate to a position of helplessness and dependency. 
In such cases courts can and do hold that there is a constitutional right 
to protection. 
In some circumstances the plaintiff can rely on the equal protection 
clause as a source of a duty to act, as where the defendant refuses 
to help on account of the plaintiff's race60 or religion. 61 But the utility 
of equal protection analysis in this area is severely limited by Washington 
v. Davis. 62 There the Court held that the plaintiff must show a pur-
pose to discriminate in order to prevail on an equal protection theory. 
Applied to the affirmative duty problem, that standard appears to 
preclude any liability unless the defendant knows of the plaintiff's plight, 
so that reckless disregard of the facts would not be enough for liabil-
ity. Even when the defendant is aware of the danger, that standard 
cannot support liability in the typical case, where the motivation behind 
. the failure to help is not discrimination against the plaintiff, but laziness, 
incompetence, fear, or indifference. 63 
There remain many cases where the governmental defendant has not 
engaged in purposeful discrimination and is not responsible for the 
plaintiff's predicament. Consider the defendant policeman who does 
nothing when another policeman, 64 or some third person, 65 attacks the 
58. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685-86 (1978); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102-04 (1976). 
59. Youngberg v. Romeo, 102 S. Ct. 2542 (1982). The Court has also held that the first amend-
ment creates an affirmative right of access to criminal trials. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. 
Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980). See generally Emerson, The Affirmative Side of The First Amend-
ment, 15 GA. L. REV. 795 (1981). 
60. Smith v. Ross, 482 F.2d 33, 36-37 (6th Cir. 1973). Cf. Plyer v. Doe, 102 S. Ct. 2382 
(1982) (equal protection clause requires states to provide public education to children not legally 
admitted into the United States). 
61. Cooper v. Molko, 512 F. Supp. 563, 567-68 (N.D. Cal. 1981). See also Downie v. Powers, 
193 F.2d 760 (10th Cir. 1951). 
62. 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976). 
63. See, e.g., Reiff v. City of Philadelphia, 471 F. Supp. 1262, 1266 (E.D. Pa. 1979). 
64. See, e.g., Byrd v. Brishke, 466 F.2d 6, 9-11 (7th Cir. 1972). 
65. See, e.g., Peck v. United States, 470 F. Supp. 1003 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). 
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plaintiff. In the latter case, there is no positive governmental connec-
tion with the harm. The principle that the Constitution protects only 
against government acts seems to preclude finding a constitutional right 
to protection. In the former variation of the example, this question 
is closer. The harm comes from a government actor, but not this defend-
ant. Unlike the prison officials, the passive officer has not contributed 
to the plaintiff's position of danger. Arguably, he "cannot fairly be 
blamed" 66 for the independent actions of another officer. 
Some courts have upheld affirmative duty claims in these cir-
cumstances, but none of them has explicitly asserted that there is a 
constitutional right to protection. A typical opinion is Byrd v. Brishke. 61 
The court said the passive policeman had breached his "duty to en-
force the laws and preserve the peace, " 68 but did -not characterize this 
as a constitutional duty, or cite any authority to support it. The court's 
failure to account for the source of this duty may be the result of a 
conflict between two strong impulses. On the one hand, they are aware 
of the Supreme Court's reluctance to create affirmative constitutional 
obligations and respect the policy considerations on which that cau-
tion rests. At the same time, these claims have strong intuitive appeal. 
The court in Byrd escaped the dilemma by imposing liability and leav-
ing a gap in its reasoning on the issue of the source of the tort 
obligation. 69 
We will not pursue further the question of just how much and what 
kind of governmental involvement is necessary to justify a constitu-
tional right to government action. Instead, we will argue that the plaintiff 
should recover whether or not there is a constitutional right to protec-
tion as a matter of constitutional common law right. Before proceeding 
with that argument, however, it will be useful to examine a special 
case where affirmative duties do have constitutional status in spite of 
the general principle that constitutional rights are negative. 
2. State law and constitutional duty- The special case arises when 
state law forms the basis for a constitutional duty. A state may by 
its laws or customs create a liberty or property interest entitled to four-
teenth amendment protection. If the state grants tenure to a college 
professor, for example, it creates a legitimate expectation that he will 
not be fired except in extraordinary circumstances. This amounts to 
66. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 102 S. Ct. 2744, 2754 (1982). 
67. 466 F.2d 6 (7th Cir. 1972). See also Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600, 626 (7th Cir. 
1979), modified, 446 U.S. 754 (1980); Wilkinson v. Ellis, 484 F. Supp. 1072, 1085 (E.D. Pa. 1980). 
68. 466 F.2d at II. 
69. The failure of the Byrd court to identify the source of the obligation is characteristic 
of many cases in this area. See, e.g., Putnam v. Gerloff, 639 F.2d 415, 423 (8th Cir. 1981); 
Beard v. Mitchell, 604 F.2d 485, 499 (7th Cir. 1979); Hamrick v. Lewis, 539 F. Supp. 1166, 
1170 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Cottonreader v. Johnson, 252 F. Supp. 492, 499 (M.D. Ala. 1966). 
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a property interest that cannot be taken without fourteenth amend-
ment due process. ' 0 
Similarly, the state might create a property interest in some form 
of government help. Reedy v. Mul/ins' 1 will illustrate the point. Plain-
tiffs there were owners of a building destroyed by fire. They brought 
a constitutional tort suit against local officials for failure to put out 
the fire, arguing that state law created an expectation of adequate fire 
protection. The court rejected their claim on the merits, but only because 
they had failed to show any entitlement to fire protection under state 
law. It found no fault with the plaintiff's theory that state law might 
create a constitutionally protected right to affirmative action by govern-
ment. If the plaintiff can establish a liberty or property right to govern-
ment action under state law, that right cannot be deprived without 
due process. The failure to act in that instance could provide the basis 
for a constitutional tort action. 72 
This means of establishing a constitutional tort duty of protection 
may occasionally succeed, but it provides only a partial response to 
the problem of 'justifying affirmative duties. As a practical matter, it 
is unlikely to be effective, for the state may avoid a duty by carefully 
structuring the obligations of state officials and local governments so 
as to preclude legitimate expectations of assistance. 73 If it is held to 
have created such an expectation, it can change its laws and practices 
and thereby avoid creating them in the future. 
These possibilities are the manifestations of a more fundamental ob-
jection to exclusive reliance on state law as a source of constitutional 
duty. The state law approach allows the state to determine just what 
degree of protection it will afford, and to whom. But the aim of con-
stitutional standards, whether affirmative or negative, is to place restric-
tions on the state's exercise of discretion on the ground that constitu-
tional values are paramount. One such value is the protection of state 
70. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). See generally Monaghan, Of 
"Liberty" and "Property", 62 CORNELL L. REV. 405 (1977). 
71. 456 F. Supp. 955 (W.D. Va. 1978). See also Shortino v. Wheeler, 531 F.2d 938 (8th 
Cir. 1976); Wooters v. Jornlin, 477 F. Supp. 1140 (D. Del. 1979), aff'd, 622 F.2d 580 (3d Cir. 
1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 992 (1980). 
72. See, e.g., Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 744 (9th Cir. 1978), which might be read 
as implicitly relying on this rationale to uphold an affirmative duty claim that a sheriff should 
have prevented the transfer of a prisoner and his consequent loss of prison earnings. On the 
other hand, Johnson may be read as standing for the proposition that any violation of state 
law can be redressed through a section 1983 action. See also Sims v. Adams, 537 F.2d 829 (5th 
Cir. 1976); Walker v. Rowe, 535 F. Supp. 55, 59 (N.D. Ill. 1982); McCoy v. McCoy, 528 F. 
Supp. 712, 715 n.8 (N.D. W. Va. 1981). This proposition is wrong, as it conflicts with Paul 
v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 699-701 (1976). See also Gore v. Wochner, 620 F.2d 183, 185 (8th Cir. 
1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 875 (1980); Jones v. Diamond, 594 F.2d 997, 1011 (5th Cir. 1979), 
cert. dismissed, 452 U.S. 959 (1981); Beker Phosphate Corp. v. Muirhead, 581 F.2d 1187, 1189 
(5th Cir. 1978). 
73. See, e.g., Reedy v. Mullins, 456 F. Supp. 955, 958 (W.D. Va. 1978). 
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created liberty and property interests, but this is not the only one. Sup-
pose state law is explicit that the policeman has no duty to warn the 
plaintiff of an attack. 74 If his claim is to succeed in constitutional tort, 
it will be necessary to develop some other foundation for it. 
B. Constitutional Common Law and Constitutional Tort 
Because of the state action requirement and the policy considera-
tions against affirmative constitutional rights, the case for a constitu-
tional right to protection is often difficult. The use of state law to 
support affirmative duties addresses only a small part of the problem. 
In this section we propose another source of constitutional tort affirm-
ative duties. The thesis is that constitutional tort is best viewed as a 
kind of constitutional common law, for it shares the attributes of other 
constitutional common law rules. 75 Furthermore, the rules governing 
constitutional tort cases are generated by the interaction of constitu-
tional law and tort principles. Within this framework, affirmative duty 
can be justified as a judge-made subconstitutional rule promoting a 
constitutionally based policy that government should protect individuals 
from injury. 
1. Constitutional common law- From time to time, in a variety 
of contexts, the Supreme Court has made rules that promote constitu-
tional values but lack constitutional stature. 76 An example is the fourth 
74. This hypothesis is not unrealistic. See, e.g., Peck v. United States, 470 F. Supp. 1003, 
1016-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); see also Liuzzo v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 923, 935-36 (E.D. Mich. 
1981). 
75. An objection to our common law approach is that it does not take into account the 
legislative history of section 1983. There are passages in the debates on the statute, for example, 
that might support the view that Congress did not intend to impose affirmative duties. See Monell 
v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978). The legislative history upon which 
the Monell Court focused, however, is not clear on this point. Perhaps the most that can be 
said is that Congress declined to impose a strict liability standard with regard to affirmative 
duties. See id. at 692-93 n.57; see also Comment, Section 1983 Municipal Liability and the doc-
trine of Respondeat Superior, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 935, 942-47 (1979). Our proposal, on the 
other hand, retains an element of fault. See infra Part III. In our view analysis of the legislative 
history of this statute is inadequate as a means of identifying the considerations that should 
count in deciding constitutional tort cases. The statute is over one hundred years old and its 
framers would not have contemplated the uses to which it is now put. With regard to current 
issues the legislative history is sufficiently ambiguous and contradictory to support either side 
of many issues. Compare Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 98-101 (1980), with id. at 106-11 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting); Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 636 (1980), with id. 
at 672-74 (Powell, J., dissenting); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341 (1979), with id. at 357-65 
(Brennan, J., concurring in judgment); Monell, 436 U.S. at 664-89 (1978), with id. at 719-24 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); and Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172-83 (1961), with id. at 224-37 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting). In any event, the legislative history of section 1983 would be rele-
vant only to actions brought under that statute and not to suits against federal officials, nor 
to actions against state officials implied from the fourteenth amendment. 
76. See Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. I (1975). 
FALL 1982) Affirmative Duty and Constitutional Tort 19 
amendment exclusionary rule, at least as it is viewed by most members 
of the present Court. The Court holds that the exclusionary rule is 
not a constitutional right but a prophylactic measure whose purpose 
is to deter constitutional violations. Accordingly, it may be ignored 
when the deterrence rationale is weak and countervailing considera-
tions are strong. 11 
Constitutional common law rules have three identifying characteristics: 
(1) their purpose is to help enforce constitutional rights or protect con-
stitutional values; (2) they are subject to modification by Congress; 
and (3) the Court does not accord them the absolute protection due 
a constitutional right. Rather, as with the exclusionary rule, the Court 
may decline to recognize these subconstitutional rights when their value 
in promoting constitutional principles is outweighed by other interests. 
The Court has never explicitly characterized constitutional tort doc-
trine as constitutional common law, but that is no barrier to recogniz-
ing it as such. The term itself was coined by Professor Monaghan and 
has rarely received the Court's imprimatur in any of the areas to which 
it applies. 78 The central point is that constitutional tort rules meet the 
criteria common to these other areas. The primary significance of this 
conclusion for our inquiry is that affirmative duties can be def ended 
without convincing the Supreme Court that it should recognize a con-
stitutional right to protection. Instead, an affirmative duty tort can 
be viewed as a subconstitutional principle, the aim of which is to pro-
tect constitutional values. 
2. The common law attributes of constitutional tort- Constitu-
tional tort meets the first criterion of constitutional common law, for 
the purpose of constitutional tort recovery is plainly to vindicate con-
stitutional values. 19 The second criterion is hard to test, because Con-
gress has rarely attempted to alter a constitutional tort right. But there 
is convincing authority to support the proposition that Congress may 
do so if it wishes. In 1961, the Court in Monroe v. Pape80 construed 
the Civil Rights Act as granting a cause of action against individuals, 
but not governmental units. The statute provides that "[e]very per-
77. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482-89 (1976); United States v. Peltier, 422 
U.S. 531, 536-39 (1975); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974). Other examples 
include implied actions for constitutional violations, see Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 
403 U.S. 388, 390-97 (1971); and, perhaps, negative commerce clause rulings, see Monaghan, 
supra note 76, at 15-17. 
78. The Court cited, with approval, Professor Monaghan's discussion of the exclusionary 
rule when it held that rule inapplicable in habeas corpus proceedings. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 
465, 485 n.22 (1976). In Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980), where the Court upheld an implied 
cause of action under the eighth amendment, the dissent objected to this particular use of consti-
tutional common law. Id. at 51-53 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
79. See Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 638-39 (1980); Owen v. City of Independence, 445 
U.S. 622, 650-51 (1980). 
80. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). 
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son" who violates constitutional rights can be liable. The Court ruled 
that governmental bodies are not persons within the meaning of the 
statute. In 1978, the Court in Monell v. Department of Social Services81 
reversed this holding. The Court explained that in the earlier case it 
had mistakenly construed the statute. In neither case did the Court 
express any doubt as to Congress' power to exempt municipalities from 
liability. 
The most telling evidence favoring a common law perspective is the 
Court's own treatment of constitutional tort. Even when the defen-
dant has committed constitutional violations, the Court permits him · 
to assert an immunity defense against paying damages. Judges, 82 
prosecutors, 83 and legislators84 are granted ~n absolute immunity. Other 
officers are accorded a qualified immunity. They escape tort liability 
for their discretionary actions so long as "their conduct does not violate 
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable 
person would have known. " 85 The Court's explanation of these im-
munity rules is that without them officials would be too cautious and 
so would not perform their jobs effectively, and capable people might 
refuse government employment. 86 For the sake of efficient government, 
individuals are denied vindication of constitutional rights. Again, the 
clear implication is that the right to recover tort damages is not itself 
of constitutional dimension. 
The Court's treatment of cause in fact also illustrates how the Court's 
respect for effective government can be implemented through sub-
constitutional doctrine. In Mt. Healthy City School District Board of 
Education v. Doy/e81 the Court held that the plaintiff school teacher 
could not recover in constitutional tort by showing that an unconstitu-
tional reason was a substantial factor in the decision to dismiss him. 
Rather, he could prevail only if the trier of fact found that he would 
have been retained but for the unconstitutional reason. Accordingly, 
if there were two independently sufficient reasons for the decision, one 
of them constitutionally impermissible and the other legitimate, the 
plaintiff would lose. This test is a stricter limit on recovery than the 
"substantial factor" test embraced by most common law courts in dual 
81. 436 U.S. 658 (1978). See also Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979) (Congress could 
have, but chose not to apply section 1983 to state governments). 
82. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967). 
83. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976). 
84. Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391 (1979); 
Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951). 
85. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2738 (1982). See also Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 
478 (1978); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974). 
86. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 320 (1975); Scheur v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 
240 (1974). See generally Cass, Damage Suits Against Public Officers, 129 U. PA. L. REV. I 110 
(1981). 
87. 429 U.S. 274, 285-87 (1977). 
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causation cases. That test holds that when either of two events is suffi-
cient to cause the plaintiff's harm, the plaintiff can recover from a 
def end ant culpably responsible for one of them if he can show it was 
a substantial factor in bringing about the harm. 88 The Court's prin-
cipal justification for the more restrictive rule was that the effective 
functioning of government would be too greatly impaired by the substan-
tial factor test. Government should be permitted to act when there are 
legitimate reasons to support its decisions, even if they are motivated 
by unconstitutional reasons as well. 89 
3. Tort policy, affirmative duties, and constitutional tort- In ad-
dition to showing that constitutional tort rights are best viewed as con-
stitutional common law and not constitutional rights, the immunity 
and causation rules yield another insight into the nature of constitu-
tional tort. They demonstrate that constitutional tort is a blend of con-
stitutional and tort principles.90 This area of tort is distinctive in that 
the Constitution, and not statutes or common law standards, governs 
the determination of the protected interests. But the extent to which 
those interests are vindicated through the damage remedy is a matter 
of tort policy. The physical, emotional, and other interests covered 
by common law tort are often subordinated to such competing policy 
considerations as avoiding overdeterrence of beneficial activity by the 
defendant.91 The immunity and causation rules illustrate the same theme 
in the constitutional context. 
This description of constitutional tort as a mixture of constitutional 
law and tort policy provides the necessary groundwork for the imposi-
tion of affirmative duties in constitutional tort. If tort policy can pro-
perly limit recovery for violation of constitutional rights, then other 
tort policy considerations can justify rules that broaden liability as well. 
In traditional common law tort, courts rely on the policy of protecting 
the plaintiff from harm to expand liability beyond negative duties and 
impose affirmative obligations. 92 That policy should be given similar 
88. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) Of TORTS§ 432(2), comment d, illustration 3 (1965); Carpenter, 
Concurrent Causation, 83 U. PA. L. REV. 941, 943-45 (1935). 
89. See 429 U.S. at 286; Eaton, supra note 6, at 453-57. See also Duncan v. Nelson, 466 
F.2d 939 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 894 (1972) (combination of immunity rules and causa-
tion rules precluded any recovery for nine years' unconstitutional imprisonment). 
90. See also Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978) (applying tort principles to damage issues 
in section 1983 cases); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 408-10 (1971) (Harlan, 
J., concurring) (applying tort principles to determine whether to recognize an implied cause of 
action for money damages under the fourth amendment); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 
(1961) ("section (1983) must be read against the common law background of tort liability"); 
Harper v. Merckle, 638 F.2d 848, 860 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 93 (1981) ("A constitu-
tional tort has both constitutional and tortious dimensions."); Burton v. Waller, 502 F.2d 1261, 
1281 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 964 (1975) (recognizing self defense as a defense 
in constitutional torts). 
91. See Cass, supra note 86, at 1153-74; Posner, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment, 1981 
SUP. CT. REV. 49, 53-58. 
92. See M. SHAPO, supra note 36. Our reliance on the immunity rules to support affirmative 
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scope in constitutional tort. 
In ordinary tort the private defendant is generally under no duty 
to rescue, but a duty may be imposed if he is somehow connected with 
the plaintiff's distress, though not necessarily culpably responsible for 
it. 93 When the defendant is a government and the libertarian argument 
against a duty is absent, a common law court that ranks protection 
ahead of discretion may impose a duty to rescue even when the govern-
ment has no connection to the harm. 94 Similarly, when the plaintiff's 
interest in protection attains constitutional status, courts should 
recognize a governmental affirmative duty to help even if the failure 
to help violates no constitutional right. 
How can the plaintiff's claim to protection aspire to constitutional 
dimension when the passive defendant has violated no constitutional 
right? The answer lies in a distinction between constitutional rights 
and the values that underlie and support those rights. Suppose an of-
ficer stands aside as private individuals intimidate plaintiffs seeking 
to exercise their first amendment rights of assembly and expression. 95 
His failure to prevent the intimidation may violate no constitutional 
right of the plaintiff, yet it reflects an utter disregard for the value 
of free speech on which that right is founded. This constitutional value 
of free expression deserves protection through a constitutional com-
mon law affirmative duty to prevent private interference with freedom 
of speech and assembly. 
Most affirmative duty cases do not present such an obvious affront 
to values that are explicit in the constitutional text. Rather, the typical 
plaintiff has suffered an ordinary beating from a third person and argues 
that the governmental defendant should have prevented it. Intuitively, 
the plaintiff's claim is appealing. It should not be denied for lack of 
an obvious constitutional basis, without an effort to develop one. In 
our view, a persuasive argument can be made that the due process 
clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments support common law 
affirmative duties here. Those provisions declare that government may 
not "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due pro-
cess of law .... " 96 The language and history of these provisions sug-
gest that the individual's rights are violated only when government takes 
duty may be questioned on the ground that the immunity rules limit liability while the protection 
policy would expand it. The objection fails, because the permissibility of introducing the immunity 
defenses turns not on their restrictive character, but on the persuasive force of the effective govern-
ment policy they implement. If equally convincing arguments can be adduced in favor of the 
protection policy, affirmative duty rules will stand on the same footing as immunity rules. 
93. See, e.g., Simonsen v. Thorin, 120 Neb. 684, 234 N.W. 628 (1931). See generally C. 
GREGORY, H. KALVEN, & R. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 325-60 (3d ed. 1977). 
94. See supra text accompanying notes 34-38. 
95. See Cottonreader v. Johnson, 252 F. Supp. 492 (M.D. Ala. 1966). 
96. U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § I. The fifth amendment reads: "No person shall be deprived 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... " 
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some action against him and not when it fails to act. 97 The values 
underlying those rights, however, are more spacious. They include both 
a procedural goal of accurate decisionmaking, and a substantive com-
mitment to the worth of the individual. One aspect of the latter value 
is that government should not be indifferent to individuals in matters 
of vital importance to them. Rather, in pursuing its goals government 
· should show concern and respect for them. 98 
This is the thread that runs through much of the due process case 
law, particularly its substantive aspects. Consider four representative 
decisions, beginning with the seminal case Meyer v. Nebraska. 99 In strik-
ing down a statute that prevented the teaching of foreign languages 
in private schools, the Court stressed that the concept of liberty "denotes 
not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the in-
dividual to ... enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law 
as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men." 100 This 
emphasis on government respect for persons is echoed in such later 
cases as Rochin v. California, 101 where the Court relied upon "those 
canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of justice 
of English speaking peoples . . . ", to forbid the forcible extraction 
of evidence from a suspect through the use of a stomach pump. Simi-
larly, in Griswold v. Connecticut, 102 the Court struck down a statute 
outlawing the sale of contraceptives to married people, explaining that 
the marital relationship was "intimate to the degree of being sacred" 
and the statute sought "to achieve its goals by means having a max-
imum destructive impact on that relationship." 103 More recently, the 
Court in Moore v. City of East Cleveland104 struck down a city zoning 
ordinance that rigidly defined permissible family relationships, ruling 
that ''the Constitution prevents East Cleveland from standardizing its 
children - and its adults - by forcing them to live in certain nar-
rowly defined family patterns." 
These cases and others like them 105 do not explicitly articulate a con-
97. See supra text accompanying notes 56-57. 
98. The term is borrowed from R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 272 (1977). See also 
G. GUNTHER, supra note 56, at 647. 
99. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
100. Id. at 399. 
101. 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952). 
102. 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965). 
103. Id. at 485. 
104. 431 U.S. 494, 506 (1977) (plurality opinion). A concurring opinion is even more emphatic 
on the importance of concern and respect, charging that the ordinance reflected "a depressing 
insensitivity toward the economic and emotional needs of a very large part of our society." 
Id. at 508 (Brennan, J ., concurring). 
105. E.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 102 S. Ct. 2542 (1982) (treatment of involuntarily committed 
patients); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491-92 (1980) 0iberty against physical constraints); Ingraham 
v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977) (physical security); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) 
(abortion). 
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stitutional value of concern and respect. Rather they focus on the par-
ticular objections to the statutes and practices under attack. What they 
share is a marked aversion to governmental rules that intrude, with 
inadequate justification, on the personal life of the individual - his 
body, close associations, and intellectual life. They ultimately rest on 
the notion that concern and respect for persons sometimes outranks 
the government's pursuit of its own goals. 
Now suppose a policeman stands aside while a third person attacks 
someone. Had the policeman taken part in the attack, the plaintiff 
would have a good claim under the due process clause, for personal 
security from bodily harm is an aspect of "liberty." 106 But because 
the policeman did not act against him, the victim apparently has suf-
fered no violation of his constitutional rights. Even so, the policeman 
has disregarded the constitutional value of concern and respect for the 
individual's vital interests just as surely as the State of Nebraska did 
in preventing the teaching of foreign languages, or the City of East 
Cleveland in forbidding extended families. It is appropriate to enforce 
that value through a constitutional tort affirmative duty, just as com-
mon law tort policies provide support for similar common law affirm-
ative duties. 101 
4. Objections to concern and respect- The remainder of the Arti-
cle proceeds on the premise that the constitutional value of concern 
and respect for persons can properly be relied upon to justify constitu-
tional tort affirmative duties. Before proceeding with the argument it 
will be useful to deal with several criticisms of the premise. First, we 
derive concern and respect from the substantive due process cases, and 
substantive due process has been criticized as an open-ended and anti-
democratic doctrine that permits judges to substitute their own values 
for those of legislative representatives. 108 The standard examples cited 
are the old economic due process cases and the more recent decision 
in Roe v. Wade, invalidating statutes that outlaw abortion. 109 
In our view the danger of judicial usurpation is worth running, for 
"meaningful freedom cannot be protected simply by placing identified 
realms of thought or spheres of action beyond the reach of govern-
ment. ... " 110 We share Professor Tribe's view that there are values 
106. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977). 
107. It does not follow that any Jack of regard for the individual's constitutional rights would 
support a constitutional tort affirmative duty claim. For example, failure of an officer to protect 
the plaintiff against illegal extradition from another state is, arguably, a far Jess serious violation 
of the value of concern and respect than failure to protect his physical safety. Cf. McBride v. 
Soos, 679 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1982) (rejecting affirmative duty in the extradition context, but 
doing so on the ground that the defendants had not violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights). 
108. See, e.g., J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 14-21 (1980); see also A. BICKEL, THE 
SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 177 (1970). 
109. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
110. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-2 at 889 (1978). Professor Tribe con-
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sufficiently fundamental to call for constitutional protection, yet lack-
ing specific textual support in the document. Our confidence in this 
judgment is bolstered by the persistence of substantive due process in 
Supreme Court doctrine, despite sustained attack from articulate critics 
both on and off the Court. 111 
Another objection is that we extend constitutional common law 
beyond its proper boundaries. The argument here is that other con-
stitutional common law doctrines are strictly remedial in character. When 
the state violates the individual's fourth amendment right against 
unreasonable search, for example, constitutional common law provides 
a remedy for the violation, in the form of an exclusionary rule or an 
action for damages. In affirmative duty cases, constitutional common 
law would be used as the source, not of a remedy, but of a substantive 
tort obligation. 
This objection amounts to a contention that constitutional common 
law may only be employed to protect constitutional rights, and not 
constitutional values. Admittedly, the case for constitutional common 
law is stronger where a violation of a constitutional right would other-
wise go without a remedy. It does not follow, however, that the doc-
trine should extend only to such situations. The test should be whether 
persuasive arguments can be made to support a particular extension. 
When that test cannot be met, as with the application of the exclu-
sionary rule to grand jury and habeas proceedings, 112 the Supreme Court 
refuses to extend a remedy even for the violation of a constitutional 
right. 113 At the same time, it seems appropriate to employ constitu-
tional common law when there are persuasive arguments for recogniz-
ing a substantive tort obligation not itself required by the Constitu-
tion, as in the affirmative duty context. 114 
Third, a critic might grant the theoretical propriety of substantive 
due process and substantive constitutional common law rights in a pro-
per case, yet argue: (a) that concern and respect does not deserve much 
tinues this passage with the assertion that "[u)ltimately, the affirmative duties of government 
cannot be severed from its obligations to refrain from certain forms of control; both must respond 
to a substantive vision of the needs of human personality." Id . 
. 111. A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 113 (1976). For 
recent resort to substantive due process theory see Youngberg v. Romeo, 102 S. Ct. 2542 (1982); 
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977). Cf. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 395-96 
(1976) (Stewart, J ., concurring) (invalidating a state regulation of marriage on a substantive due 
process analysis). 
112. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974). 
113. Recall also that in some circumstances tort policy considerations can wholly preclude 
any remedy for a constitutional violation even where there is an otherwise applicable statutory 
remedy. See supra text accompanying notes 80-89. 
114. Professor Monaghan suggests that the invalidation of state-created trade barriers under 
the negative implications of the commerce clause may be an example of constitutional common 
law. Monaghan, supra note 76, at 17. Such cases illustrate the use of constitutional common 
Jaw to establish substantive rules. 
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weight against the countervailing discretion value, because executive 
officers are better able than courts to determine how to use resources 
in the public interest and can be trusted to do so; or (b) that concern 
and respect is a vague and indefinite concept that can easily be abused 
to require any number of government services; or (c) that a tort obliga-
tion might have the perverse effect of giving government officers an 
incentive to avoid seeking out dangers, for fear they may be held liable 
when they do not render adequate aid. The first of these points, like 
the objection to substantive due process, reflects a dispute about value 
choices and cannot be made to yield to analysis or argument. It can 
be partially deflected, however, by crafting principles of decision that 
cabin the range of concern and respect, and by taking care to impose 
affirmative duties only in situations where discretion is a relatively weak 
value. By giving specific scope to concern and respect, the develop-
ment of decisional guidelines will also meet the contention that the 
concept is too vague to be of use in fashioning doctrine. These prob-
lems are more fully confronted in Part III. 
The merits of the final objection, on perverse incentives, turn on 
the empirical questions of how much disincentive the duty would pro-
duce, and whether those untoward consequences are greater than the 
benefits to be gained from the increased incentive to help when the 
governmental defendant is nevertheless confronted with a plaintiff in 
peril. 115 The empirical work has not been done, and the questions are 
so difficult that they might never be resolved with confidence. The 
better course may be to refrain from basing legal rules on such 
considerations. 116 
C. Distinctive Features of Constitutional Affirmative Duty Tort 
The foregoing discussion of constitutional tort demonstrates that af-
firmative duty has sound theoretical underpinnings despite the negative 
character of constitutional rights. It also lays the foundation for iden-
tifying several differences between constitutional tort and common law 
tort. Because of these differences the analysis and the result of a con-
stitutional tort affirmative duty case may differ markedly from a com-
mon law case. 
1. Discretion- Constitutional tort is similar to common law tort 
in that the value of discretion is a counterweight to the plaintiff's in-
terest in protection, and therefore acts as a restraint on the imposition 
of government affirmative duties. It might be objected that discretion 
115. See Landes & Posner, supra note 14, at 119-24. 
116. See Epstein, The Social Consequences of Common Law Rules, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1717, 
I 720-21 (1982). 
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should carry no weight in the constitutional context, because constitu-
tional claims cannot be denied on the basis of anything less than a 
compelling state interest. The trouble with this argument is its implicit 
premise that constitutional tort law is nothing but constitutional law. 
As we have seen, it is in faet a mixture of tort and constitutional prin-
ciples, and tort principles can and do sometimes preclude the vindica-
tion of constitutional claims. Even when the constitutional tort claims 
derive from constitutional rights, the immunity defenses often preclude 
their satisfaction. The discretion value that limits the scope of affirm-
ative duty claims is closely related to the concerns for efficiency, ef-
fective government, and administrative judgment that motivate the im-
munity rules. 
There is, however, an important difference between common law 
tort and constitutional tort with respect to discretion. A common law 
court may place a low value on democratic and administrative deci-
sionmaking, and consequently might impose many common law affir-
mative tort obligations on government. Even so, the court's rulings 
would be subject to political checks, as the legislature could nullify 
the decisions. 111 This political constraint may permit the court to exer-
cise a freer hand in imposing affirmative duties. Any misjudgments 
it makes about the views of the voters as to the proper role of govern-
ment can be corrected legislatively. 
Constitutional tort affirmative duties are less flexible. They cannot 
be abrogated by state legislatures, 118 except in the special case where 
they depend on state law creating a liberty or property interest. On 
the other hand, if these are properly characterized as constitutional 
common law rules, then Congress may later reject them, just as it might 
preclude suit against municipalities or enact immunity rules. Instead 
of fifty state legislatures, only the United States Congress can act as 
a check on judicially created constitutional common law tort rules. 
This reduction is avenues for popular political redress necessarily makes 
these rules less susceptible to change. 119 
117. Cf. Connor v. Great W. Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 69 Cal. 2d 850, 447 P.2d 609, 73 Cal. 
Rptr. 369 (1968), where the court held that a lender owes an affirmative duty to home purchasers 
to oversee the building of the houses. The legislature promptly nullified the decision. CAL. Civ. 
CODE § 3434 (Dearing 1972). See generally Note, Liability of the Institutional Lender for Struc-
tural Defects in New Housing, 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 739 (1968). 
118. Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 284 (1980) (state legislatures cannot immunize 
state officials from section 1983 liability). 
119. The Court's opinion in Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980), suggests that there may 
be limits on Congress' power in this regard. Carlson held that a federal prisoner may bring · 
an implied cause of action under the eighth amendment, even though Congress in the Federal 
Torts Claims Act permitted suit only against the United States. The Court said that it would 
deny an implied action if "Congress has provided an alternative remedy which it explicitly declared 
to be a substitute for recovery directly under the Constitution and viewed as equally effective." 
Id. at 18-19 (emphasis in original). 
This language suggests that Congress may not abolish recovery entirely. That conclusion is 
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2. Protection.- In traditional common law torts the justification 
for imposing affirmative duties is the plaintiff's claim to government 
protection of his physical and emotional well-being against threats from 
sources other than the defendant. The justification for a constitutional 
tort affirmative duty is different in a subtle but important way. Here 
the basis for tort liability is that it promotes constitutional values, in 
particular the constitutional value of government concern and respect 
for individuals' life, liberty, and property. Therefore, an affirmative 
duty should be imposed on government only when these constitutional 
values are threatened, and not any time the plaintiff's physical and 
emotional safety are in danger. 
With this difference in mind, the question whether protection is a 
stronger or weaker interest in constitutional tort cannot be answered 
in the abstract. It requires a further inquiry into whether concern and 
respect (or, in a rare case, some other constitutional value) 120 are in 
jeopardy in a given case. If that value is at issue, then the case may 
be appropriate for a constitutional tort duty even though a common 
law court would deny the claim. On the other hand, if the circumstances 
indicate no particular threat to constitutional values, the case is inap-
posite for constitutional tort even though a common law court might 
impose an affirmative duty. 
Whether a case poses a threat to concern and respect, and thereby 
not at all clear, however. Read broadly, it seems inconsistent with well-settled doctrine that both 
individual and governmental defendants can be excepted from liability. See supra text accompanying 
notes 80-86. The issue in Carlson was not whether Congress could abolish the tort remedy but 
whether the Court should recognize an additional avenue of relief on which Congress was silent. 
Taken in context, then, the Court's standard might well be directed only to that narrow issue 
and not Congress's power to abrogate. In any event, the most the statement could be read for 
is that Congress cannot abrogate tort relief for violations of constitutional rights. If, as we have 
argued, affirmative duty claims are often not constitutional rights, the Carlson standard would 
not bar Congressional abrogation of those claims. 
120. Occasionally first amendment values are at stake in affirmative duty cases. See Cooper 
v. Molko, 512 F. Supp. 563 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (religion); Cottonreader v. Johnson, 252 F. Supp. 
492 (M.D. Ala. 1966) (expression). 
121. See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 670-71 n.39, 672 (1977); Paul v. Davis, 
424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976); Zeller v. Donegal School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 517 F.2d 600, 604 (3d 
Cir. 1975) (plurality opinion); H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 90-92 
(1973). 
Some commentators have argued that the large number of cases reaching the federal courts 
under section 1983 is by itself a good reason for limiting the scope of constitutional tort. See, 
e.g., Whitman, supra note 1, at 26-30. This is a weak argument, for at least three reasons. First, 
it wholly ignores the less drastic solution of routing the cases to state courts, for decision under 
federal constitutional standards. This seems a more appropriate answer to the problem of crowded 
federal dockets than restricting substantive constitutional tort rights. Second, the caseload prob-
lem is not by itself an adequate justification for choosing constitutional tort as the candidate 
for restriction. Why not narrow the scope of diversity jurisdiction instead? See Bivens v. Six 
Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 401 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring). Third, as the Court 
recently noted in response to such a resources argument, caseload problems are the responsibility 
of Congress under its Article III power to regulate the federal court system. See Patsy v. Board 
of Regents, 102 S. Ct. 2557, 2566 n.13 (1982). 
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qualifies for a constitutional tort affirmative duty, turns on the defen-
dant's state of mind and his ability to help. The more he knows about 
the plaintiff's danger and the easier it is for him to respond, the more 
seriously his inaction disregards that constitutional value. Thus, the 
policeman who watches as the plaintiff is beaten flouts concern and 
respect more than the policeman who negligently fails to inquire into 
suspicious cries, and the negligent policeman shows less concern and 
respect than the officer who has no reason to know of the attack. There 
is no basis for an affirmative constitutional tort duty in the last situa-
tion. There is a strong case in the first, though some courts have re-
jected liability even here. The hard question, which we take up in Part 
III and answer in the negative, is whether the negligent policeman should 
be liable. 
D. Federalism and Constitutional Tort 
This account of protection in constitutional tort has an important 
corollary. Most constitutional tort suits are brought in federal court 
under section 1983, and seek to impose federal constitutional obliga-
tions on state and local governments. This use of federal judicial power 
to enforce federal standards against state and local officials creates 
friction between federal and state governments, and raises the ques-
tion whether a proper regard for the independence of state govern-
ments in the federal system justifies restrictions on constitutional tort, 
including but not limited to affirmative duties. 
Critics of constitutional tort invoke the values of federalism and con-
tend that many of these cases should be routed to state courts for deci-
sion under state tort law. 121 They point out that many constitutional 
tort claims arise from fact situations that could also support common 
law tort claims. The plaintiff has suffered some injury to person or 
property and seeks compensation, either from the governmental actor 
responsible or, in the case of affirmative duties, a government or of-
ficer who failed to act. Proponents of federalism as a restraint on con-
stitutional tort argue that state courts and state law can deal adequately 
with these tort cases and that constitutional tort is an unnecessary in-
trusion into state prerogatives. 122 
· A premise of this argument is that the plaintiff loses little except 
his choice of courtrooms when the litigation proceeds under state com-
mon law rules. This premise is incorrect, for there is a fundamental 
difference between the analysis of a state law tort case and a constitu-
122. See, e.g., Whitman, supra note 1, at 30-40; Aldisert, Judicial Expansion of Federal 
Jurisdiction: A Federal Judge's Thoughts on Section 1983, Comity, and the Federal Caseload, 
1973 LAW & Soc. ORD. 557. 
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tional tort case. Common law tort deals with the clash between the 
plaintiff's interest in physical and emotional well being and the defen-
dant's interest in acting as he wishes. In constitutional tort the plain-
tiff's interests include constitutional rights and values. In the affirmative 
duty context, constitutional tort differs in that not only the plaintiff's 
physical and emotional well being are at stake but also the consdtu-
tional value of concern and respect. Common law courts may take 
this value into account, but they have no obligation to do so, and there 
are indications in the case law that many do not. In Doe v. Hendricks, 123 
for example, the police were warned of a possible serious crime in pro-
gress. A strange man had taken a small boy into an abandoned building. 
Yet, with no pressing business to detain him, the police officer who 
took the warning call took no action at all for twenty minutes. The 
court engaged in a traditional common law analysis and, finding no 
"special relationship," denied liability. It gave no attention at all to 
the constitutional value of concern and respect. Yet consideration of 
that value could lead to a different result. 124 
Recognizing that constitutional torts implicate different values than 
common law torts does not entirely dispose of the federalism rationale 
for limits on constitutional tort. We have already seen that tort policy 
plays a large role in fashioning constitutional tort rules. It might be 
argued that, in spite of the differences between constitutional and com-
mon law tort, federalism should also play a part in restricting the scope 
of constitutional tort. 125 Unlike the earlier version, there is no analytical 
flaw in this refined federalism rationale. The Court might choose to 
weigh federalism as heavily as the efficiency value that motivates the 
immunity rules. In that event it might proceed to make various restric-
tions on the availability of constitutional tort remedies, and limits on 
affirmative duties may be one of these. 
The difficulty with the revised federalism rationale is that it requires 
a choice of values that we, and perhaps the Court as well, are unwill-
ing to make. Its premise is that constitutional rights and values should 
be compromised out of regard for state and local independence. 126 In 
other contexts the Court has rejected that premise. In the past it held 
that the fourteenth amendment applies less stringent restrictions on 
123. 92 N.M. 499, 590 P.2d 647 (1979). See also Warren v. District of Columbia, 444 A.2d 
1 (D.C. 1981). 
124. In Part III, infra notes 131-52, we develop the argument that reckless disregard of 
suspicious facts can support an affirmative duty. The facts of Doe arguably meet that test. Other 
examples of cases like Doe are cited supra notes 23 & 52. 
125. Perhaps this modified federalism rationale is what the proponents of federalism, cited 
supra notes 121-22, have in mind when they call for limits on constitutional tort. Their reasoning 
is sufficiently ambiguous and suggestive to support either version of the federalism argument. 
126. For more elaboration of this point, see Durchslag, Federalism and Constitutional Liber-
ties: Varying the Remedy to Save the Right, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 723 (1979); Weinberg, The 
New Judicial Federalism, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1191 (1977). 
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the states than the Bill of Rights imposes on the national government. 
But over the past fifty years it has incorporated virtually every impor-
tant provision of the Bill of Rights into the fourteenth amendment. 121 
Today it invokes federalism to limit federal jurisdiction under various 
comity doctrines, 128 but the effect of federalism is to allocate constitu-
tional decisionmaking to state courts, not to limit substantive 
guarantees. 129 Proponents of federalism-based restraints on constitu-
tional tort must demonstrate why this area is different and demands 
a greater role for federalism, a task they have not yet begun. 130 
III. Two DECISIONAL GUIDELINES 
What rules should govern the resolution of affirmative duty con-
stitutional tort cases? The task here is to devise rules that suitably ac-
commodate the constitutional value of concern and respect on the one 
hand, and the discretion value on the other. Toward that end, affirm-
ative duties should be imposed only when the discretion value is weak 
and the defendant's affront to concern and respect is egregious. We 
propose two general principles. First, when the government actor knows 
the plaintiff is in danger and can easily help him, he should be liable 
for failure to act. In contrast, if either knowledge or ability is lacking, 
no duty should be imposed. Second, when the government is in some 
way connected to the plaintiff's distress, the requirements of knowledge 
and ability should be relaxed. The degree of knowledge and ability 
demanded for liability should vary inversely with the extent of the defen-
dant's responsibility for the plaintiff's threat. These guidelines are ar-
ticulated only fitfully in the case law, although many of the results 
can be reconciled with them. We will show that they lead to better 
results and more convincing justifications than the re:isoning offered 
by the opinions. 
A. Knowledge and Ability 
Unless the defendant bears some responsibility for the plaintiff's 
127. The history is recounted in G. GUNTHER, supra note 56, at 476-501. 
128. See Wells, The Role of Comity in the Law of Federal Courts, 60 N.C.L. REV. 59 (1981). 
129. Moreover, in allocating constitutional issues to state courts, the Supreme Court has empha-
sized its confidence in their ability and willingness to uphold constitutional standards. See, e.g., 
Allen v. Mccurry, 449 U.S. 90, 105 (1980); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493-94 n.35 (1976); 
Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 611 (1975). 
130. Indeed the Court is as yet unwilling even to allocate constitutional decisionmaking to 
state courts in this area, or to require the exhaustion of state administrative remedies. Patsy 
v. Board of Regents, 102 S. Ct. 2557 (1982). But cf. Fair Assessment in Real Estate, Inc. v. 
McNary, 102 S. Ct. 177 (1981) (requiring resort to state court for damage claims arising from 
allegedly unconstitutional taxation, relying on co·mity and the policy of the tax injunction act). 
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danger, courts should impose a duty to help only when the defendant 
knows of the plaintiff's need and can easily help. The case for a duty 
of easy rescue is intuitively appealing and can be justified analytically 
in terms of the discretion and protection values that shape government 
affirmative duty law. The protection value is especially strong because 
this failure to help is a flagrant violation of the values underlying the 
fourteenth amendment. The fourteenth amendment safeguards personal 
security against government invasion, 131 and the foundation for that 
protection is the value of governmental concern and respect for the 
individual. The government officer who stands aside as a third person 
attacks the plaintiff does not himself violate the fourteenth amend-
ment, but he off ends the value of concern and respect on which it 
is based. 
At the same time, the discretion value is especially weak. Here a 
decision to help does not require a large commitment of resources. 
By hypothesis, rescue can be affected easily. Nor does the imposition 
of a duty entail a debatable choice among alternative views of the goals 
that government should pursue. Virtually everyone agrees that engag-
ing in easy rescue is a proper task of government. 132 
Despite these considerations some courts have rejected a constitu-
tional tort duty in this situation. For example, the plaintiff in Howell 
v. Cataldi1 33 was attacked by a policeman. Two policemen were pre-
sent at the time and the plaintiff did not know which had beaten him, 
so he sued both of them. The court held he could not recover against 
either, not having identified his assailant. 
On the basis of the strong protection interest here, the court should 
have held that both could be liable, one for the beating and the other 
for not preventing it. But the court did not pause to examine the com-
peting values. It disposed of the claim by stating a maxim on the law 
of battery, and citing a treatise: "[m]ere presence of a person, where 
an assault and battery is committed by another, even though he men-
tally approves of it, but without encouragement of it by word or sign, 
is not sufficient of itself to charge him as a participator in the assault." 134 
This black letter rule is inapposite because it deals with the obligations 
of individuals and not governments. 
Other courts, while not denying affirmative duties altogether, have 
placed unjustifiable limits on liability. For example, the plaintiff in 
McCoy v. McCoy 135 was a prisoner who had been beaten by one guard 
131. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977). 
132. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Sturges, 222 U.S. 313, 322 (1911); Lee v. State, 490 P.2d 
1206, 1209 (Alaska 1971); Wood v. Morris, 109 Ga. App. 148, 135 S.E.2d 484, 487 (1964). 
· 133. 464 F.2d 272 (3d Cir. 1972). See also Howard v. Gonzales, 658 F.2d 1331, 1338-39 
(5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 983 (1981) (by implication). 
134. 6 C.J .S. Assault· and Battery § 27 (1955), quoted in 464 F.2d at 282. 
135. 528 F. Supp. 712, 715 (N.D. W. Va. 1981). 
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while the defendant, another guard, looked on. The court denied 
recovery and said that liability would be appropriate only if the passive 
onlooker were the attacker's superior. The court did not explain why 
liability should be limited to supervisors. It dealt with the issue merely 
by citing an earlier fourth circuit case, Davis v. Zahradnick, 136 in which 
the court had upheld supervisory liability, but had not spoken to the 
issue presented in McCoy. 
Perhaps the court in McCoy was uncomfortable with the notion of 
an affirmative duty untied to a pre-existing responsibility for oversight. 137 
If the defendant were a private actor, libertarian values would support 
the court's hesitation. If the governmental defendant were not aware 
of the danger or unable to act on it, the discretion value would be 
a strong counterweight to liability. But in the circumstances of McCoy, 
there is no persuasive argument against an affirmative duty, and the 
court's limitation of liability to supervisors draws a distinction where 
there is no significant difference. 138 
The line drawn in McCoy between supervisors and other officers 
suggests another, equally bad distinction. Under McCoy, the existence 
of an affirmative duty apparently depends on whether the attacker is 
himself a government actor. Most courts have rejected such a 
limitation. 139 Even when the attacker is a policeman, the courts have 
justified the imposition of liability on broader grounds. Thus, in Byrd 
v. Brishke, 140 the passive defendant was held liable not merely because 
the attacker was a policeman, but because he breached his "duty to 
uphold the law and preserve the peace,'' a duty that is equally ap-
plicable to the officer who fails to stop an attack by a private individual. 
While the courts have not explained why they reject this distinction, 
their intuition is consistent with our analysis of protection and discre-
tion. Whether the attacker is an officer or not does not significantly 
affect either the plaintiff's interest in rescue or the actor's discretion 
interest. The threat to constitutional values may be greater when the 
third party is a government actor, but that threat is strong enough 
to support liability no matter who the attacker is. Indeed, liability would 
be appropriate even when the threat is from some natural catastrophe 
like a fire, provided the requirements of knowledge and ability are met. 
136. 600 F.2d 458 (4th Cir. 1979). 
137. The court suggested a different result might be reached if state law imposed a duty 
to intervene. 528 F. Supp. at 715 n.8. For reasons previously discussed, deference to state law 
in defining federal constitutional protections is generally unwarranted and unwise. See supra 
text accompanying notes 120-29. 
138. See also Putnam v. Gerloff, 639 F.2d 415, 423-24 (8th Cir. 1981), (finding liability on 
facts similar to those of McCoy). 
139. See Beard v. Mitchell, 604 F.2d 485, 495-99 (7th Cir. 1979) (upholding jury verdict for 
defendant); Cooper v. Molko, 512 F. Supp. 563, 566-68 (N.D. Cal. 1981). 
140. 466 F.2d 6, 11 (7th Cir. 1972). 
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Other courts seem to have implicitly held that there is no affirmative 
duty to protect the plaintiff's property. In Harris v. City of Roseburg 141 
a creditor utilized self-help repossession to enforce his lien on plain-
tiff's tractor. Fearing a violent confrontation, the creditor asked the 
police to be present. Granting a motion for summary judgment the 
court held that "mere acquiescence" by the city and the policeman 
in a repossession was insufficient to support an action against them. 
Rather, they could only be held liable if they had "assist[ed] in effec-
tuating a repossession over the objection of a debtor or so intimidated 
a debtor as to cause him to refrain from exercising his legal right to 
resist a repossession." 142 But suppose the debtor attempted to resist, 
as he had a legal right to do, and the police stood by while the creditor 
took the property illegally. This case differs from a beating case only 
in that the plaintiff's property and not his personal security is threatened. 
The fourteenth amendment protects property as well as personal security, 
and the police show an equal lack of concern and respect for property 
in an illegal repossession case as they do for personal security in a 
beating case. The affirmative obligations of government should include 
protection of the plaintiff's property as well as his personal security. 143 
The facts of Cooper v. Molko 144 suggest another possible limit on 
recovery, relating to the defendant's motive. In that case a youthful 
member of the Unification Church had been abducted by his parents 
and held for deprogramming. He alleged that the defendant police of-
ficers knew of this and did nothing. Even after he managed to escape 
and requested their help, they refused it because he was a member 
of the Unification Church. The court held that he could recover if 
he could prove these facts. 
Suppose the motive was not disapproval of the church, but only in-
difference or incompetence. The court does not address the question 
whether liability would be appropriate in those circumstances, but its 
reliance on bad motive suggests that it might treat them differently. 
Again, the distinction seems inappropriate. If the motive for failing 
to act is disapproval of the plaintiff's religion, the case for an affirma-
tive duty is all the stronger. The defendant has disregarded not only 
the plaintiff's general liberty interests in freedom of movement and 
141. 664 F.2d 1121, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 1981). See also United States v. Coleman, 628 F.2d 
961, 964 (6th Cir. 1980); Menchaca v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 613 F.2d 507, 510 & n.4 (5th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980); Hollis v. Bailey, 534 F. Supp. 565, 567 (E.D. Mo. 1981). 
142. 664 F.2d at 1127. 
143. It might be argued that these cases are more defensible than we have suggested, because 
the policeman might have reasonably thought the repossession was legal and hence that the taker 
had done no wrong. That rationale would be acceptable, but it is beside the point. The difficulty 
with Harris and cases like it is that the courts stress the mere lack of action by the police and 
not their beliefs about whether any wrongdoing had taken place. 
144. 512 F. Supp. 563, 566-68 (N.0. Cal. 1981). 
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personal security, but also the specific first amendment value of freedom 
of religion. Yet, the former value is strong enough standing alone to 
justify an affirmative duty, even when the motive does not relate to 
first amendment values. 
Persuasive arguments can be made against all of these limitations 
on the duty to help when the defendant knows of the danger and can 
easily help. The harder question is just how much knowledge should 
be required, and how easy the rescue must be. Knowledge and ease 
of rescue are both continuums, so there is no readily identifiable point 
at which lines can be drawn. Even so, the analysis of discretion and 
protection is helpful, for it suggests that the requisite knowledge should 
be substantial. Defendants should not be liable for carelessly failing 
to pursue suspicious facts. Nor should the defendant be liable when 
a prudent officer would have made sure he had the ability to help, 
and this defendant negligently had no opportunity. In short, the stan-
dard of care demanded should be knowledge of danger or reckless 
disregard of the facts, and not the reasonable care required by the 
traditional common law negligence standard. 
This departure from the common law rule is justified by several 
distinctive features of constitutional tort, especially with respect to af~ 
firmative duties. The justification for constitutional tort is that con-
stitutional rights and values are not adequately taken into account in 
the traditional common law of torts. In particular, that body of law 
gives no special weight to the plaintiff's constitutional right against 
arbitrary government deprivations of life, liberty, and property, 145 or 
to the value of concern and respect for the individual on which those 
rights are founded. This rationale supports constitutional tort affirm-
ative duties only to the extent that value is threatened. The more the 
defendant knows, the mpre seriously it is endangered. 
The value of concern and respect, then, is distinct from the plain-
tiff's interest in rescue. It is at issue only when the government def en-
d ant acts or fails to act with some disregard for the plaintiffs welfare. 
Negligence in failing to pursue suspicious facts or to take proper steps 
against dangers might show some lack of concern, but it might also 
manifest incompetence, panic, general laziness, and other qualities that 
have little or nothing to do with the government actor's concern and 
respect for the plaintiff. In any event, negligence demonstrates far less 
indifference to the plaintiff than knowing or reckless failure to act. 
When the government or its officer is a defendant in an affirmative 
duty case, the considerations against recognition of a duty are sum-
marized by the discretion value. Either out of respect for the political 
145. Even today there are many state tort rules immunizing governments and officers from 
various forms of liability. See generally Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 680-83 
(1980) (Powell, J., dissenting). See also cases cited supra note 52. 
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process or for reasons of institutional competence in defining the role 
of government, courts should hesitate to create affirmative duties. These 
concerns are weak or absent when the defendant knows of the danger 
and can take steps against it, because there is widespread agreement 
that this is a proper role of government and no massive shifts in resource 
use are required. In contrast, a negligence standard permits courts to 
make controversial decisions about what degree of knowledge should 
provoke further inquiry, and what commitment of resources, for ex-
ample policemen or fire trucks, is a reasonable response to the general 
problem of crime or fire prevention. Perhaps a common law court, 
confident of its own ability to decide what government should do and 
in any event subject to legislative reversal, legitimately could impose 
affirmative duties under a negligence test. 146 But discretion is a stronger 
impediment to affirmative duty in constitutional tort, because the courts' 
decisions are less subject to legislative nullification. 
With these observations in mind, consider Reiff v. City of 
Philadelphia. 141 The plaintiff was shot by an armed robber and sued 
the city for damages. She claimed that the city violated her constitu-
tional right to police protection by its ''policy of not responding to 
calls until a crime has actually been committed and ... [by] the alleged 
failure to provide adequate police protection in a high crime area.'' 
Finding that ''the Constitution does not explicitly or implicitly pro-
vide a right to adequate police protection," 148 the court rejected her 
claim. 
The court's rationale is subject to question, as it focuses only on 
whether there is a constitutional right to police protection, and does 
not consider whether a constitutional tort duty should be imposed to 
vindicate constitutional values. The reasoning in the opinion could be 
used to deny a tort claim when the police know of the plaintiff's danger 
and fail to respond. On the facts of Reiff, however, the court's result 
seems proper. Here the plaintiff did not assert that the police knew 
of the immediate danger to her, but relied on the general inadequacy 
of police policies on crime prevention. The relation between those 
policies and any absence of concern and respect for any particular plain-
tiff is somewhat attenuated. In addition, the plaintiff effectively askec! 
146. Compare Symmonds v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. Ry. Co., 242 N.W.2d 
262 (Iowa 1976) (county may be held liable for negligently failing to erect a stop sign at a railroad 
crossing), with Hull v. City of Duncanville, 678 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1982) (failure to install a 
traffic light preemptor circuit at an intersection near a railroad crossing is not redressable under 
section 1983); compare Lewis v. State, 256 N.W.2d 181 (Iowa 1977) (state may be held liable 
for the negligent design and construction of a highway), with York v. City of Cedartown, 648 
F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1981) (allegation of negligently designed and constructed street and drainage 
system did not state a cause of action under section 1983). 
147. 471 F. Supp. 1262 (E.D. Pa. 1979). See also Tetalman v. Holiday Inn, 500 F. Supp. 
217 (N.D. Ga. 1980). 
148. 471 F. Supp. at 1264. 
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the court to make broad policy decisions about the allocation of govern-
ment resources among police and other departments of city govern-
ment, and within the police department itself. A judicial decision at 
such a high level of generality would have seriously impeded the discre-
tion of elected policymakers to determine what goals government should 
pursue and how to attain them. 
There is another, less abstract but equally important reason why 
discretion mandates a knowing or reckless disregard standard. Under 
a negligence standard, the required precaution will often be the deten-
tion or surveillance of a third person suspected of planning an attack 
on the plaintiff. The police will be required to make a reasonable judg-
ment whether some action is necessary. Inevitably, they will sometimes 
mistakenly harass an innocent person. This might result in violation 
of that person's constitutional rights, and, in turn, it could subject 
the police to liability to him} 49 
Beard v. Mitchel/1'° illustrates the point. Plaintiff's decedent was 
killed by a man under investigation by the FBI for other crimes. He 
sued the FBI agent in charge for failing to prevent the murder by ar-
resting the murderer on the other charges before the crime. The court 
correctly rejected the plaintiff's theory, holding that plaintiff must show 
the agent knew the murder would take place or recklessly disregarded 
facts showing it. 151 In response to the plaintiff's claim that the agent 
should have arrested the assailant sooner on other charges, the court 
said "[w]e would certainly be reluctant to embrace a rule of law which 
constitutionally required an investigating officer to arrest an individual 
in the early stages of an investigation." 152 Both the general argument 
for discretion and these specific untoward consequences of a negligence 
rule argue in favor of a knowing or reckless disregard standard. 
B. Control and Responsibility 
Suppose the plaintiff's assailant is a policeman, and plaintiff wishes 
to recover from his supervisor or the local government that employs 
him for failure to take steps to stop the attack; or the plaintiff is a 
prisoner who is attacked by a guard or another inmate, and wishes 
to sue the prison superintendent for failure to take proper precautions 
against attacks. Such cases arise frequently in constitutional tort 
litigation. 
149. See, e.g., Terket v. Lund, 623 F.2d 29 (7th Cir. 1980) (affirming summary judgment 
for defendants). 
150. 604 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1979). 
151. The only problem with the court's opinion on this score is its insistence that the plaintiff 
must show the violation of a constitutional right. See id. at 495. 
152. Id. at 500 (emphasis in original). 
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1. Relaxing the knowledge and ability rule- These plaintiffs seek 
to impose affirmative duties on governments and government officers, 
yet they differ from the cases previously examined in one important 
aspect. In these cases the governmental defendant is in some way im-
plicated in the plaintiff's misfortune. Governmental connection with 
the harm introduces considerations of fairness into the duty analysis, 
which strengthen the plaintiffs case and thus justify relaxation of the 
strict knowledge and ability principle. Government control over the 
plaintiff and defendant or government responsibility for the plaintiff's 
vulnerability can support a duty to learn about the danger and to assure 
that there are resources available to deal with it. 1 53 
This principle is analogous to the common law exception to the no-
duty rule when the defendant is connected with the plaintiff or his 
injury in some way. The individual may have an obligation to help 
if this conduct is causally, though not culpably, related to the harm, 1 l 4 
or if he has undertaken to help the plaintiff, l ll or if there is some 
special relationship between him and the plaintiff, like common car-
rier and passenger 1 l 6 or landlord and.tenant. 1 l 7 With respect to the 
common law tort obligations of government actors, this principle is 
reflected in the cases discussed in Part I where courts point to govern-
mental involvement or promises or special relationships as a basis for 
affirmative duty. i ls 
The insight motivating all of these exceptions is that it is unjust to 
permit the defendant to ignore the plaintiff's predicament when he 
himself has played some role in bringing it about. This precept applies 
to constitutional tort as well. Here the justification for a departure 
from the knowledge and ability rule is that the constitutional duty to 
show concern and respect demands more care when the government 
has control of the plaintiff and renders him vulnerable, as with a prison 
inmate, or when government is at least partially responsible for the 
threat posed by his assailant, as when the assailant is a policeman. 
In such circumstances it is not enough for government to act only when 
it knows of a danger and can easily respond. It also should face an 
obligation to find out about dangers and to take precautions in ad-
vance to assure that rescue will be feasible. In practice, most courts 
153. Because the state action requirement is met in these cases, the plaintiff's right may be 
characterized as a constitutional right and need not depend on constitutional common law for 
support. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 102 S. Ct. 2542 (1982) (right to treatment). See also supra 
text accompanying notes 56-59. 
154. L.S. Ayres & Co. v. Hicks, 220 Ind. 86, 40 N.E.2d 334, 41 N.E.2d 356 (1942). 
155. Black v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 193 Mass. 448, 79 N.E. 797 (1907). 
156. Bullock v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 266 F.2d 326 (5th Cir. 1959). 
157. Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1977). See generally 
C. GREGORY, H. KALVEN & R. EPSTEIN, supra note 93, at 325-60; R. KEETON & P. KEETON, 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF TORTS 384-405 (2d ed. 1977). 
158. See supra text accompanying notes 39-48. 
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have recognized a stricter governmental duty to supervise employees 
and protect persons in custody, although they do not explicitly note 
the distinction or give reasons for it. They do not require knowledge 
and easy rescue; instead, some of them use formulas like "gross 
negligence" and "deliberate indifference" to describe the requisite stan-
dard of care, 159 while others have adopted a negligence standard. 160 
2. Negligence versus gross negligence- Whether negligence is 
preferable to gross negligence or deliberate indifference requires a rather 
fine value choice between the plaintiff's claim to fair treatment and 
the competing demands for discretion. It is a choice that could 
legitimately be made either way in both the supervisory and custody 
cases. 161 In making that choice, however, courts should take account 
of two further analytical points. 
First, if a single standard is used to govern all variations on the theme 
of control and responsibility, it should not be applied woodenly to 
each fact situation. Rather, its application should take account of dif-
ferences from case to case in the degree of government responsibility 
for the plaintiff's plight. For example, the deliberate indifference stan-
dard should impose a stricter duty on prison officials to protect in-
mates from guards and other prisoners, where the government has vir-
tually absolute control over the plaintiff and substantial responsibility 
for the danger, than in other situations where its connection with the 
danger is more attenuated. 
The perceptive opinion in Doe v. New York City Department of 
Social Services162 recognized as much. There the plaintiff was a foster 
child who had been mistreated by her foster father. She sued the place-
ment agency that put her in the home for failure adequately to super-
vise her placement. The court adopted deliberate indifference as the 
test for liability, but pointed out that "deliberate indifference ought 
not to be inf erred from a failure to act as readily as in a prison con-
text . . . . '' 163 The court explained that prison officials and other in-
stitutional administrators "can readily call in subordinates for con-
sultation ... [and] can give orders with reasonable assurance that they 
159. See, e.g., Hays v. Jefferson County, 668 F.2d 869, 874 (6th Cir. 1982); Orpiano v. 
Johnson, 632 F.2d 1096, 1101 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 929 (1981); Owens v. Haas, 
601 F.2d 1242, 1246 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980 (1979). 
160. See, e.g., Gullatte v. Potts, 654 F.2d 1007, 1012 (5th Cir. 1981); McClelland v. Facteau, 
610 F.2d 693, 697 (10th Cir. 1979). 
161. Courts have differed sharply on the value choice. Compare Hays v. Jefferson County, 
668 F.2d 869, 874 (6th Cir. 1982) (liability only for "training that is so reckless or grossly negligent 
that future police misconduct is almost inevitable"), with McClelland v. Facteau, 610 F.2d 693, 
697 (10th Cir. 1979) ("The standard to be applied is the conduct of a reasonable person, under 
the circumstances . . . . "). 
162. 649 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1981). 
163. Id. at 142. 
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will be followed .... " 164 The placement agency, in contrast, was forced 
''to rely upon occasional visits for its information gathering, and its 
relationships to the foster family was less unequivocally hierarchical 
than is the case with prison guards and a warden . . . The agency 
felt ... pressured to minimize intrusiveness, given its goal of approx-
imating a normal family environment for foster children. " 165 In short, 
because prison officials can exercise more control over the plaintiff's 
environment, more care can be demanded of them regardless of the 
formula used to determine liability. 
The second point follows from the first. Courts have not distinguished 
among these control and responsibility cases, some applying a negligence 
standard to the lot and others a gross negligence standard, regardless 
of the particular circumstances. Given wide variations in the degree 
of control and responsibility, a better approach may be to use two 
standards rather than one. A distinction could be made between cases 
where control and responsibility is greater and those where it is less, 
and the former could be governed by a negligence standard and the 
latter by gross negligence. 
· The low control group includes Doe as well as the more common 
case where a policeman hurts the plaintiff and the plaintiff sues the 
policeman's supervisor or municipal employer. 166 The most common 
fact pattern in the high control category is the suit by an inmate against 
prison officials for failure to protect him against an attack. 167 It also 
includes such cases as Hall v. Tawny, 168 in which a public shool stu-
dent was severely paddled by a teacher and sought to hold supervisors 
liable for failing to prevent the beating, and White v. Rochford, 169 
in which the police arrested the driver of a car on an expressway and 
took him away, leaving the child passengers stranded and helpless. 
The argument for a negligence standard is stronger in cases like these 
than in the police supervisory cases because government responsibility 
for the plaintiff's well being is greater. The government has made the 
plaintiff vulnerable to extraordinary dangers, has taken away his abil-
ity to def end himself and has removed other sources of protection. 
Fair treatment requires that the government provide equivalent pro-
tection to what it has taken away. In addition, the countervailing discre-
tion value is not strong when the plaintiff and the attacker are both 
members of a closed environment like a prison or school and rela-
tively small shifts in resources are at issue. In these circumstances, a 
164. Id. See also McKenna v. County of Nassau, 538 F. Supp. 737 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (applying 
"deliberate indifference" standard to inmate beating case). 
165. Id. 
166. See, e.g., Hays v. Jefferson County, 668 F.2d 869 (6th Cir. 1982). 
167. See, e.g., Gullatte v. Potts, 654 F.2d 1007 (5th Cir. 1981). 
168. 621 F.2d flJ7, 615 (4th Cir. 1980). 
169. 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979). 
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reasonable care standard may be the appropriate measure of tort 
obligation. 110 
Now consider the case where a policeman or some other govern-
ment officer does harm and the plaintiff sues a supervisor or the local 
government that employs him. The def end ant is partially responsible 
for the injury, for he gave the attacker a gun and a police uniform. 
Without these the attacker may never have encountered the plaintiff, 
and the plaintiff would have been less vulnerable to him. 111 At the 
same time, this fact pattern differs from the custody cases in that the 
defendant has no control over the plaintiff. Nor can he easily restrain 
the policeman attacker, or even find out about the danger he represents, 
without some commitment of resources. Discretion is a stronger value 
here and fairness a less compelling one. Perhaps a gross negligence 
standard is an appropriate compromise. 112 
CONCLUSION: TOWARD ANALYTICAL CLARITY 
The biggest problem with the constitutional tort affirmative duty 
cases is not the results, many of which can be reconciled with our two 
decisional guidelines, but the methods by which courts reach those 
results. In pure affirmative duty cases like Byrd v. Brishke113 courts 
have failed to identify the source of the constitutional duty to render 
· 170. An objection to the negligence test proposed in the text is that the high control case 
does not differ at all from the no-government-connection case with respect to the potential im-
pact of affirmative duty upon the rights, and potential legal claims, of putative third party attackers. 
See supra text accompanying notes 149-52. The prison official might face "a Hobson's choice 
between alternative eighth amendment claims" of the inmate who is attacked and one who is 
segregated on account of suspicion that he might attack another; accordingly, officials should 
not be liable for negligence in safeguarding prisoners. Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d 701, 721 
(7th Cir. 1973). The trouble with this argument is that in a high control case like Miller the 
problem can be handled by transferring or segregating the complaining prisoner away from the 
potential assailant. 
171. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 243 (1974) (section 1983 protects citizens against 
the "misuse of power, ... made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority 
of state law") (footnote omitted) (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)). 
172. Of course, like most legal distinctions, the line between these two kinds of cases is not 
a sharp one. Perhaps there is more control in the Doe case than in the police supervisory cases 
with which we have grouped it, for in Doe the plaintiff was unable to care for herself and was 
dependent on the defendant. Similarly, some inmate cases involve less control than the typical 
attack case. See, e.g., Swietlowich v. County of Bucks, 610 F.2d 1157 (3d Cir. 1979) (prisoner 
committed suicide). 
There are also cases featuring some government involvement in the plaintiff's harm, but not 
enough to warrant a departure from the knowledge and ability principle. See, e.g., Beard v. 
Mitchell, 604 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1979) (defendant FBI agent dealt with an informant who assisted 
in murder of plaintiff's decedent); Maiorana v. MacDonald, 596 F.2d 1072, 1077-78 (1st Cir. 
1979) (policeman who allegedly gave drugs, money, and guns to decedent informant was not 
responsible for his shooting by other police). 
173. 466 F.2d 6 (7th Cir. 1972). 
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aid, adverting to a "duty to enforce the laws and preserve the peace," 
but not explaining how this attains constitutional status or how far 
it extends. The absence of a convincing rationale in doctrine and policy 
for the constitutional duty to help invites the apparent distinction drawn 
in the repossession cases between harm to the person and harm to prop-
erty, and the distinctions between private and governmental assailants, 
and between supervisors and co-workers, on which McCoy v. McCoy' 74 
appears to rest. It also helps explain why judges search for other con-
stitutional grounds on which to base affirmative duty. An illustrative 
case is Cooper v. Molko, ' 75 where the plaintiff's allegations could sup-
port religious freedom and equal protection claims. 
Affirmative duties, however, should not be so limited. The rationale 
developed here identifies the constitutional value of concern and respect 
as the policy basis for affirmative duties and utilizes constitutional com-
mon law as the doctrinal vehicle for implementing that policy. It pro-
vides a persuasive basis for affirmative duty, avoids artificial limits 
on it, and properly restricts it to circumstances where the countervail-
ing value of governmental discretion lacks force. 
Where there is governmental connection with the harm, the courts' 
results are generally consistent with the principle that control and respon-
sibility justify relaxing the knowledge and ability requirements. 116 But 
the opinions arrive at those results by routes far different from the 
one suggested here. In the prison context, courts justify affirmative 
duties on the ground that negligence or gross negligence in failing to 
protect inmates amounts to cruel and unusual punishment. 111 In the 
supervisory context their approach has been shaped by the Supreme 
Court's holding in Monell v. Department of Social Services:' 18 that 
governments are not vicariously liable for the constitutional torts of 
their employees. Instead, a municipality can only be held liable if the 
employee was acting in accordance with the city's "policy or custom." 
How, then, can the city be liable when a policeman beats a suspect 
and the city does not direct, encourage, or condone the beating of 
suspects? Because the courts respect the policy considerations under-
pinning the principle of control and responsibility, they have devised 
a means of enforcing that principle in spite of the rule against respondeat 
superior. They say that negligence or gross negligence in training or 
174. 528 F. Supp. 712 (N.D. W. Va. 1981). 
175. 512 F. Supp. 563 (N.D. Cal. 1981). 
176. There are exceptions. See, e.g., Ragusa v. Streator Police Dep't, 530 F. Supp. 814, 
817 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (police not liable for damages to plaintiff's impounded car unless they knew 
it would be vandalized and did nothing to protect it). 
177. See, e.g., Gullatte v. Potts, 654 F.2d 1007, 1012 (5th Cir. 1981); Jones v. Diamond, 
594 F.2d 997, 1004 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. dismissed, 453 U.S. 950 (1981). 
178. 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
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supervision of employees can amount to a "policy or custom" within 
the Monell rule. 179 
One difficulty with these rationales is that they can permit artificial 
distinctions between cases that are analytically similar. The cruel and 
unusual punishment approach used in the prison cases cannot comfor-
tably be adapted to other cases where the government exercises substan-
tial control over the plaintiff and the assailant. For example, the court 
in Hall v. Tawny 180 said that school supervisors had no affirmative 
duty to protect a pupil from unconstitutionally brutal corporal punish-
ment by a teacher unless the knowledge test was met. But school of-
ficials exercise nearly as much control over the pupil, in the course 
of a school day, as prison officials over the inmate. 181 Accordingly, 
they should be held to a gross negligence standard, if not ordinary 
negligence. 
This example reflects a more fundamental defect in the courts' 
methods. Characterizing grossly negligent prison administration as 
punishment permits them to reach acceptable results, but the 
characterization itself is unconvincing. It twists the concept of punish-
ment out of shape to apply it to conditions that are not deliberate. 
A more cogent explanation for liability is that the grossly negligent 
prison officials have not shown adequate concern and respect for those 
in their charge. The courts' approach to the problem of municipal liabil-
ity is similarly artificial. Grossly negligent supervision violates the con-
stitutional value of concern and respect and justifies liability. In the 
ordinary use of language, however, policies and customs are conscious, 
deliberate, and well-known practices. 182 Courts must distort.these words 
to reach results that could be more directly, and more persuasively, 
explained in terms of the analysis advanced here. 183 
179. See, e.g., Hays v. Jefferson County, 668 F.2d 869, 875 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 
51 U.S.L.W. 3254 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1982) (No. 81-2256); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1246 (2d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980 (1979). See Schnapper, Civil Rights Litigation After Monell, 
79 COLUM. L. REV. 213 (1979). 
180. 621 F.2d 607, 615 (4th Cir. 1980). 
181. .But cf. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 668-71 (1977) (distinguishing prisoners from 
school children on the issue of whether the eighth amendment applies to school discipline). 
182. This certainly appears to be the Monell Court's understanding of these terms. See Monell 
v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-95 (1978). See also Addickes v. S.H. Kress 
& Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167-68 (1970). 
183. The Court's efforts to delineate the proper scope of liability of individual supervisors 
for the acts of their subordinates have also been inadequate. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 
(I 976), states that supervisors cannot be held responsible for the constitutional violations of others 
unless their own conduct was "causally linked" to those breaches, id. at 375, and some of the 
Court's language appears to preclude any affirmative duty to control underlings, id. at 376. 
Two years later, in Monell, the Court characterized Rizzo as having held only that supervisors 
cannot be held liable on account of "the mere right to control without any control having been 
exercised and without any failure to supervise .... " 436 U.S. 658, 694 n.58 (1978). This stan-
dard apparently allows liability when there is a failure to supervise; see, e.g., Spriggs v. City 
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Finally, the courts' focus on such concepts as policy and punish-
ment diverts their attention away from the question of control and 
responsibility, which is the most important issue these cases present. 
More attention to differences among cases with regard to control and 
responsibility might facilitate the distinction suggested earlier, between 
custody cases where government control is higher and negligence may 
be the appropriate standard, and supervisory cases where government 
control is less and gross negligence may be the better test. As matters 
stand, the courts' cruel and unusual punishment rationale cannot easily 
support a negligence rule in inmate cases, as that standard would depart 
even further than gross negligence from ordinary conceptions of 
punishment. 184 Yet good argumen_ts of poHcy can be made that 
negligence is the better test in inmate cases and other high control cases. 
An explanation that begins with the constitutional value of concern 
and respect can more easily justify a negligence test for liability. 
Analytical clarity is an important goal in the development of doc-
trine, not only for the sake of candor and intelligible rules, but also 
because the mode of analysis influences the shape of the substantive 
standards. Calling supervisory carelessness a form of punishment or 
inadequate training a policy turns these concepts into fictions. Fictions 
sometime serve a useful purpose, as where doctrine has calcified on 
some point of law and for that reason cannot be challenged openly. 185 
But there is no compelling reason to introduce them into constitutional 
tort, for the law in this area is not yet frozen into black letter rules. 
There is still time to ground affirmative duties in the constitutional 
value of concern and respect, where they belong. 
of Chicago, 523 F. Supp. 138, 141-42 (N.D. Ill. 1981), but does not identify the source of the 
duty to supervise or the standard of care by which to measure official conduct. Again, our analysis 
supplies what is missing in the opinions. It provides a foundation for the duty in the constitu-
tional value of concern and respect and justifies a negligence or gross negligence standard of 
care by the principle of control and responsibility. 
184. See, e.g., Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d 701, 720 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 
1146 (1974). 
185. See L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 56-59 (1967). 
